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Abstract
In European countries recently hit by a sovereign debt crisis, banks have sharply
raised their holdings of domestic sovereign debt, reduced credit to rms, and faced rising
nancing costs, raising concerns about economic and nancial resilience. This paper
develops a general equilibrium model with optimizing banks and depositors to account
for these facts and provide a framework for policy assessment. Under-capitalized banks in
default-risky countries have an incentive to gamble on domestic sovereign bonds. Unless
there is perfect transparency of bank balance sheets, the optimal reaction by depositors to
bank insolvency risk leaves the economy susceptible to self-fullling shifts in sentiments.
In a bad equilibrium, sovereign risk shocks lead to a prolonged period of nancial fragility
and a persistent drop in output. The model is quantied using Portuguese data and
generates similar dynamics to those observed in the Portuguese economy during the debt
crisis. Policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between alleviating funding constraints and
strengthening incentives to gamble. Liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good
equilibrium when not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate
adverse equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Since the eruption of the European debt crisis, the share of domestic sovereign debt held
by the national banking system has increased sharply in crisis-hit countries. This created a
nexus between the nancial health of banks and sovereigns, and was associated with a rise in
bank funding costs and a decline in credit to the private sector.1 The high exposure of banks
in crisis-hit countries to domestic sovereign debt is considered an important, if not the key,
source of instability in the recent European sovereign debt crisis (see e.g. Acharya et al., 2014a;
Brunnermeier et al., 2016; Farhi and Tirole, 2016). The question is then: why have banks in
crisis-hit countries become so highly exposed to domestic sovereign debt?
In this paper, I address this question from a novel angle, calling attention to the interactions
between banks and depositors, each optimizing their portfolio strategies vis-à-vis the prospect of
a sovereign debt crisis. I develop my analysis by specifying a dynamic small open economymodel
with households, rms, and a banking sector. Banks collect deposits from households and choose
their portfolios of sovereign bonds and loans to rms; households lend to banks on terms that
depend on bank solvency prospects; rms invest. The government issues default-risky bonds.
The model is specied under two realistic assumptions: some opacity that prevents households
from knowing exactly the balance sheet of a bank, and (quantitatively small) sovereign default
costs that reduce a banks prot over and above the direct losses on its sovereign bond holdings.
My main results are as follows: I rst show that, in combination with limited liability, any
anticipation of sovereign default costs that may hit banks independently of their holdings of
sovereign bonds gives bank managers an incentive to gamble on domestic sovereign debt. I
model these costs as reecting all balance sheet losses that a domestic sovereign default can
impose on banks other than the direct impact of the haircuts on sovereign bonds. By way of
example, default usually leads to a deterioration in the value of illiquid assets, loss of access to
foreign nancing needed to roll over debt, and higher taxes.
The core contribution is to show that banksincentive to gamble crucially depends on the
interaction between the optimal strategies of bank managers and depositors during a sovereign
debt crisis. Banks optimally choose whether to gambleby increasing their exposure to domes-
tic sovereign bonds to a level that would leave them insolvent in the event of sovereign default.
To the extent that deposit insurance is incomplete and/or lacks credibility, households opti-
mally act on their assessment of bank solvency prospects by demanding higher rates on their
1See Acharya and Ste¤en (2015) regarding the rise in domestic sovereign debt holdings. Several studies
provide evidence on the adverse e¤ects on bank lending, see e.g. Acharya et al. (2014b), Becker and Ivashina
(2014), De Marco (2014) and Popov and Van Horen (2015). Acharya and Ste¤en (2012) and Acharya et al.
(2014a) show that exposure to risky sovereign debt is associated with an increase in funding costs. See also the
empirical evidence in section 2.
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deposits.2 With perfect transparency of a banks portfolio choice, this would impose market
discipline on bank managers and o¤set their temptation to gamble. With some opacity, I show
that the economy is susceptible to self-fullling shifts in depositor sentiments.
Expectations may then coordinate on a bad equilibrium where sovereign default also causes
a banking crisis. In this equilibrium, shocks to sovereign risk simultaneously raise bank funding
costs and drive banks to increase their purchases of domestic government debt at the expense
of credit to the private sector. I calibrate the model to Portugal over 2010-2016 and show
that simulated dynamics under the bad equilibrium match the observed trends in key nancial
variables in the Portuguese economy.
Finally, I show that the model can be used as a framework to assess central banksliquidity
interventions in support of nancial intermediaries. Non-targeted interventions face a trade-o¤
between their goals of alleviating banksfunding conditions and strengthening the incentives to
gamble. When bank net worth is low, non-targeted liquidity provision may actually eliminate
the good equilibrium. On the contrary, targeted interventions that provide liquidity conditional
on bank leverage overcome the adverse trade-o¤, eliminating the bad equilibrium.
In more detail, the optimal strategies of banks and households are sketched as follows.
During a sovereign debt crisis, bank managers may adopt either a safeor a gamblingstrategy.
The safe strategy consists of investing in a precautionary manner with the goal of remaining
solvent even in the event of a sovereign default. The gambling strategy consists of pursuing
high exposure to sovereign bonds, and leads to insolvency after sovereign default. Banks with
low net worth nd the gambling strategy more attractive, for a well known reason: they have
less skin in the game. If the government does not default ex-post, domestic sovereign bonds
pay a high return driven by the default-risk premium; if the government imposes a haircut on
bond holders, banks are shielded from the full consequences of the default by limited liability.
Households optimally determine the terms of their deposits to banks according to bank
solvency prospects. I rst show that the dependence of bank solvency on deposit repayment
obligations creates a kink in the optimal deposit schedule. Above a threshold level of deposits,
households anticipate that banks will become insolvent in the event of sovereign default and
demand higher interest payments in compensation. Another determinant of bankssolvency
prospects is their exposure to domestic sovereign debt. The higher this exposure is, the lower
the level of deposits at which banks become insolvent in case of default. Increasing exposure
thus translates into an inward shift of the deposit threshold.
With full transparency of bank balance sheets, the anticipated tightening of the deposit
threshold would deter banks from increasing their sovereign exposure, and by extension, rule
2Deposit insurance schemes typically guarantee deposits only up to a limit (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008). In
real terms, depositor losses can take the form of a suspension of convertibility and a currency re-denomination
as well as an explicit bail-in.
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out a gambling strategy. However, banks are typically able to obscure the composition of
their investment in a variety of ways, including reliance on shell corporations and complex
nancial instruments.3 I assume, realistically, that households cannot directly observe sovereign
exposures and have to form expectations about banksstrategies.
I refer to anticipations of a safe strategy as good sentiments, as opposed to bad sentiments
associated with anticipation of gambling. Since the gambling strategy revolves around higher
exposure, bad sentiments result in a tightening of the deposit threshold. Bank managers strive
to satisfy a solvency constraint under the safe strategy. Any shift to bad sentiments further
constrains their ability to raise funds and reduces the value of the safe strategy relative to
gambling. Bad sentiments may then become self-fullling when the tightening of the deposit
threshold makes it optimal for banks to adopt the gambling strategy.
I solve for a rational expectations equilibrium and nd that the characterization of the
equilibrium outcome is contingent on bank net worth. With su¢ ciently high net worth, bank
managers adopt a safe strategy regardless of the location of the deposit threshold and only
positive sentiments are conrmed in equilibrium. Conversely, only a gambling equilibrium may
be sustained with su¢ ciently low net worth. Within an intermediate region of net worth,
sentiments become self-fullling as described above. I refer to this as the multiplicity region.
Shocks to sovereign risk amplify the impact of sentiments on bank funding costs and expand
the multiplicity region.
The safe and gambling equilibria give rise to very di¤erent paths of macroeconomic adjust-
ment to sovereign risk shocks. In a safe equilibrium, banks deleverage to satisfy their solvency
constraints, reducing both sovereign bond purchases and loans to rms. Bank funding costs
then remain at the risk-free rate and net worth increases rapidly. The result is a sharp, but
short-lived recession, where the nancial soundness of the banking sector is preserved. In a
gambling equilibrium, banks increase their sovereign exposure rather than deleveraging. This
leads to the crowding out of bank lending and to high bank funding costs that hinder the
increase in bank net worth. When bad sentiments persist, the economy becomes stuck in a
gambling trapcharacterized by a prolonged period of nancial fragility and a persistent drop
in output.
The model is quantied using aggregate macroeconomic and banking data for Portugal over
2010-2016. A comparative exercise is conducted by simulating the model under a series of
sovereign risk shocks that emulate Portuguese sovereign bond yields over the debt crisis. The
simulation places the Portuguese economy in the multiplicity region and simulated dynamics
under bad sentiments (i.e. the gambling equilibrium) match the observed behaviour of key
nancial variables in the Portuguese economy.
3The level of deposits, on the other hand, is public information. Although banks may also raise funds through
less transparent methods, this has no impact on the repayment prospects of depositors due to their seniority.
4
Finally, the model is used to assess policy interventions. I rst show that liquidity provision
cannot constitute an e¤ective intervention when it is not targeted, irrespective of the seniority
of o¢ cial debt. When the repayment of o¢ cial debt takes precedence over deposits, liquidity
provision is completely ine¤ective. This is because households anticipate the dilution of their
claims to bank revenues in the event of insolvency, and optimally reduce their demand for de-
posits in a manner that exactly o¤sets central bank liquidity. If, on the other hand, deposits are
perceived to take precedence, liquidity provision constitutes an implicit transfer of insolvency
risk from depositors to the central bank. Far from assuading depositor concerns, this provides
additional funding for banks to gamble with and facilitates an increase in sovereign exposures
until bank funding costs return to their pre-intervention level. As a result, the intervention
backres by eliminating the safe equilibrium at low levels of net worth and making sentiments
self-fullling at higher levels.
These adverse consequences are rooted in the inability of non-targeted interventions to
distinguish between banking strategies, which leads to a trade-o¤ between alleviating bank
funding conditions and strengthening incentives to gamble. It is possible to overcome this
trade-o¤ with a targeted intervention that provides liquidity conditional on bank leverage.
With the appropriate conditionality, targeted liquidity provision insulates the banking sector
from shifts in household sentiments, thereby eliminating the gambling equilibrium throughout
the multiplicity region.
These ndings can be generalized to a wider set of policy instruments. On its own, deposit
insurance faces the same trade-o¤ as non-targeted liquidity provision. A wide range of macro-
prudential policy instruments can be used in conjunction with deposit insurance to overcome
the trade-o¤, leading to a similar outcome as targeted liquidity provision. Specically, this
outcome is implementable using regulatory constraints on bank liabilities or capital regulation
with a positive risk-weight on domestic sovereign bond holdings.
Relationship to the literature This paper is related to the literature on sovereign debt
and nancial frictions. The strong positive relationship between sovereign risk and private
borrowing costs is well documented (see e.g. Acharya et al., 2014b; Popov and Van Horen, 2015)
and incorporated in reduced form by several studies including Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe
and Yue (2006), and Corsetti et al. (2013). This paper builds upon a growing literature that
provides microfoundations for the aforementioned relationship by exploring the links between
sovereign default and the domestic banking sector. The existing literature can be divided into
two main strands according to the channel of transmission.
In the rst strand, which includes Basu (2010), Gennaioli et al. (2014), Sosa Padilla (2015)
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and Perez (2015), agency frictions constrain banks ability to leverage.4 Sovereign default
tightens this constraint by weakening bank balance sheets, forcing banks to deleverage and
reduce nancial intermediation. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Bocola (2016) show that the
ex-ante anticipation of sovereign default is su¢ cient to generate these e¤ects, leading to a
decline in sovereign bond purchases as well as intermediation. Like Bocola (2016), I take
sovereign default risk as given and focus on its transmission to the banking sector.
In the second strand, depositors in domestic banks are shielded from potential losses in the
event of sovereign default due to a variety of reasons, such as a bailout of the banking sector
in Brunnermeier et al. (2016) and Farhi and Tirole (2016), deposit insurance in Livshits and
Schoors (2009) and selective sovereign default in Broner et al. (2014). This undermines market
discipline such that banks respond to a rise in sovereign risk by increasing their domestic debt
purchases in order to take advantage of high yields.
An important contribution of this paper is to consider the interplay between the optimal
strategies of banks and depositors, and its implications for the propagation of sovereign risk. By
replacing the respective assumptions in these strands with limited liability, limited transparency
of bank balance sheets and non-bond costs of domestic sovereign default, I develop a framework
with two possible equilibrium outcomes; a safe equilibrium which gives rise to a transmission
mechanism similar to the rst strand, and a gambling equilibrium that resembles the second
strand.
Analysing the circumstances under which these equilibria arise yields two important insights.
First, strategic complementarities between the optimal responses of banks and depositors lead to
a region of bank net worth with multiple equilibria. This gives rise to multiple adjustment paths
to a given sovereign risk shock since the prevalent equilibrium at a given time period determines
future net worth and hence the possible equilibrium types in future periods. Second, policy
interventions have equilibrium-switching e¤ects in addition to the within-equilibrium e¤ects
considered in the previous literature. These e¤ects are signicant precisely because of the
considerable di¤erence in the propagation of sovereign risk under the two equilibria.
A closely related study is that of Acharya et al. (2014a). They also consider a framework
where banks face insolvency risk, but focus on the governments bailout decision rather than
strategic interactions between banks and depositors. This paper is also related to a recent
strand of research that considers the interplay between sovereign risk and nancial fragility.
Cooper and Nikolov (2013) analyse the interaction between self-fullling debt crises as in Calvo
(1988) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank runs, whereas Leonello (2016) considers similar
interactions in a global games framework. Two layers of strategic complementarities are overlaid
4Sosa Padilla (2015) depicts bank liabilities as a constant ow. This leads to a similar transmission mechanism
as the studies with agency frictions since a haircut on sovereign bonds directly reduces the funds available for
intermediation. Brutti (2011) and Perez (2015) also consider the e¤ects of sovereign default on banksability
to store liquidity. Sandleris (2014) considers the signalling e¤ects of sovereign default.
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in these studies; one across sovereign debt-holders and another across depositors. This paper
instead focuses on strategic complementarities between the optimal responses of banks and
depositors.
This paper also draws from a rich literature on the repatriation of sovereign debt in open
economies. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) document this in the context of the European
sovereign debt crisis.5 Three alternative hypotheses have come to the fore as a potential ex-
planation. First, creditor discrimination theories suggest that sovereign risk drives a wedge
between the valuation of sovereign debt by domestic and foreign agents due to anticipated dis-
crimination in favour of the former during a default event (Broner et al., 2014). Second, moral
suasion theories suggest that governments in need of funding incentivize or directly coerce do-
mestic banks to purchase their debt (Chari et al., 2016). The third hypothesis corresponds to
the gambling mechanism considered here; under-capitalized banks nd default-risky domestic
sovereign debt attractive for risk-shifting purposes, since its payo¤ is positively correlated with
their solvency prospects.
Brutti and Sauré (2016) nd evidence in favour of creditor discrimination, while Acharya
and Ste¤en (2015), Battistini et al. (2014) and Altavilla et al. (2016) lend support to both
moral suasion and risk-shifting theories. DeMarco andMacchiavelli (2016), Becker and Ivashina
(2014) and Ongena et al. (2016) provide additional evidence for moral suasion.6 It is important
to note that these channels are not mutually exclusive. In fact, a weak form of moral suasion,
whereby the government purposefully neglects to regulate against risky domestic sovereign bond
purchases, is conducive to gambling. Uhlig (2014), Farhi and Tirole (2016) and Crosignani
(2015) discuss the optimality of this from the domestic governments perspective.7
Finally, this paper is related to two recent studies on central bank liquidity provision in
the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. Drechsler et al. (2016) show that lender of
last resort loans were mainly taken by under-capitalized banks and used for purchases of risky
sovereign debt. Crosignani et al. (2016) show that the Long Term Renancing Operations
(LTRO) adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB) induced Portuguese banks to increase
their holdings of risky domestic sovereign bonds. In the gambling equilibrium of this model,
(non-targeted) liquidity provision leads to a similar outcome when there is an implicit transfer
of bank insolvency risk away from depositors.
5See also fact 1 in the next section for further details.
6Acharya and Ste¤en (2015) nd evidence for gambling by showing that banks with high leverage and risk-
weighted assets and low Tier 1 capital have more exposure to risky sovereign debt, especially in countries hit
by the debt crisis. See also fact 2 in the next section.
7In the context of the Euro area, gambling is faciliated by the zero risk-weight attached to sovereign bonds
issued by European Union member states in capital regulation (Bank for International Settlements, 2013).
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Layout The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the key stylized facts about
the European sovereign debt crisis. Section 3 describes the core mechanisms of the model
in a simplied, two-period framework. Section 4 presents the full dynamic model. Section
5 describes the propagation of sovereign risk shocks and examines the t of the model to
Portuguese data. Section 6 conducts policy analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Facts
In this section, I present four key stylized facts about the European sovereign debt crisis and
the ensuing sovereign-bank nexus. I focus on ve countries that were hit by the crisis, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (periphery), and contrast them with Germany (core), as a
benchmark.
Fact 1. In the periphery, the share of domestic sovereign debt held by the national banking
system has sharply increased.
Figure 1 shows that the yield spreads between sovereign bonds issued by the periphery
countries and Germany (as a benchmark for safe assets) increase sharply after 2009 and peak
in 2012. Thereafter, the spreads decrease but remain higher than their pre-crisis levels. Con-
currently, there is an increase in the share of domestic government debt held by banks resident
in these countries. In contrast, there is a decrease in the share of German sovereign debt held
by German banks.
Fact 2. Under-capitalized banks in the periphery have increased their exposure to domestic
sovereign debt, while the exposures of well-capitalized banks in the periphery and German
banks have remained nearly constant.
The rst panel of Figure 2 shows that the average domestic sovereign exposure of under-
capitalized banks in the periphery has nearly doubled over 2010-2016, while that of capitalized
banks remained approximately constant. This indicates a negative relationship between bank
capitalization and the change in domestic sovereign debt exposures over the debt crisis.8 The
second panel shows that under-capitalized German banks have a larger exposure to their own
governments bonds compared to those with high capitalization. In contrast to the periphery,
however, sovereign exposures of German banks with low and high capitalization do not follow a
measurably di¤erent pattern over the crisis. This is also true for their exposure to bonds issued
by peripheral countries as shown in the last panel. Thus, there is no apparent relationship
between bank capitalization and changes in sovereign exposures for banks based in Germany.
8For an empirical analysis, see Acharya and Ste¤en (2015). They reach the same conclusion with a regression
that controls for bank and country characteristics.
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Figure 1: Sovereign bond holdings and yield spreads
Note: Sovereign bond yields refer to bonds with 10 year maturity. Spreads are from German sovereign bond
yields. Portuguese data on bond holdings is only available until 2012 and on an annual basis. All other data is
quarterly. Source: OECD (MEI) and Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012).
Figure 2: Bank capitalization and sovereign exposures
Note: Sovereign bond exposure refers to the share of sovereign bonds within total assets. No data is available
for Greek banks. Low capitalization refers to banks with a Tier 1 Capital ratio below the rst quartile in 2009.
High capitalization refers to those above the third quartile. Source: Bloomberg and the European Banking
Authority.
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Together, these two ndings lend support to the gambling hypothesis which suggests that
under-capitalized banks based in default-risky countries have a specic incentive to purchase
their own governments debt. This is due to the combination of limited liability with the an-
ticipation of balance sheet costs independent to their sovereign bond holdings in the case of
their own governments default. The latter aspect makes domestic sovereign bonds particularly
suitable for risk shifting, since they yield a high return in the states of nature where banks have
better solvency prospects.9
Contrast this with a mechanism that suggests the increase in domestic sovereign bond
purchases is driven solely by limited liability. Under the regulatory framework present in the
Euro area, sovereign bonds issued by all European Union member states carry zero risk-weight
in capital regulation (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Therefore, if limited liability
was the sole driving factor, under-capitalized German banks would also have an incentive to
purchase periphery sovereign debt. This would in turn lead to a negative relationship between
bank capitalization and periphery exposure in Germany, which is not observed in Figure 2. In
a similar vein, creditor discrimination e¤ects where the expectation of selective default leads
to the repatriation of risky sovereign debt, would lead to an increase in domestic sovereign
exposure of periphery banks regardless of their capitalization. This is also not observed in
Figure 2.10
Fact 3. In the periphery, banks reduced their lending to the private non-nancial sector while
increasing their domestic sovereign bond holdings. At the same time, there was a rise in
private borrowing costs.
Figure 3 shows that the volume of domestic sovereign bonds held by the national banking
sector has increased by varying degrees in the periphery, ranging from about 30% in Spain to
nearly double its initial amount in Ireland and Portugal. At the same time, credit to the private
sector by domestic banks decreased by up to 30% in each periphery country except for Italy
where it stagnated. Figure 4 shows that interest rates on loans to non-nancial corporations
also increased at the peak of the debt crisis in 2011-2012, especially in Portugal and Greece.
In Germany, on the other hand, banks reduced their holdings of both domestic and periphery
sovereign bonds, and slightly increased their lending to the private sector. There was also a
9In the case of sovereign default, gambling banks do not internalize the complete extent of the haircut on
domestic sovereign bonds since they are protected by limited liability.
10The patterns in Figure 2 are also compatible with the moral suasion hypothesis under the condition that
risky governments can exert greater pressure on under-capitalized banks to purchase domestic sovereign debt.
Note that the gambling and moral suasion hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. In fact, a weak form
of moral suasion where the government neglects to regulate the domestic sovereign exposure of local banks is
conducive to gambling. The optimality of this from the risky governments perspective is analysed by Crosignani
(2015), Farhi and Tirole (2016) and Uhlig (2014).
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Figure 3: Bank lending
Note: Sovereign bond holdings are attained using data from EU-wide stress tests and transparency exercises.
There is no data available for Greek banks. Domestic bank credit to private non-nancial sector refers to
nancial resources provided to the private non-nancial sector by domestic banks that establish a claim for
repayment. Source: World Bank and the European Banking Authority.
signicant improvement in borrowing conditions faced by private non-nancial corporations,
with a decline of over 200 basis points in loan interest rates between 2010-2016.
A mechanism that can generate patterns similar to those present in Figures 3 and 4 is the
crowding out of bank lending by domestic sovereign bond purchases.11
Fact 4. There is substantial co-movement between sovereign bond yield spreads and bank fund-
ing costs in the periphery.
Figure 5 plots bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads and deposit interest rates against
sovereign bond yield spreads and Table 1 reports the corresponding correlation coe¢ cients.
11For further empirical evidence on the e¤ects of the sovereign debt crisis on credit to the private sector, see
Acharya et al. (2014b), Becker and Ivashina (2014), De Marco (2014) and Popov and Van Horen (2015).
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Figure 4: Loan interest rates
Note: Loan interest rates refer to loans of all amounts by domestic banks to non-nancial corporations (new
business). Source: ECB.
The CDS spreads co-move signicantly with sovereign spreads in the periphery, consistent with
the notion of a sovereign-bank nexus where the solvency prospects of the government and the
banking sector are intertwined.12 To a lesser extent, deposit interest rates also move with yield
spreads, especially during the peak of the crisis in 2011-2012. A potential explanation for this is
that depositors expect a decline in the real value of their deposits in the event that the banking
sector and government are both in default.
In the next section, I show in a simple model that gambling on domestic sovereign debt can
arise as an equilibrium outcome when banks are under-capitalized. In this gambling equilibrium,
bank lending is crowded out by domestic sovereign bond purchases and bank funding costs co-
move with domestic sovereign bond yields, consistent with the stylized facts described here.
12Acharya et al. (2014a) show that changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after con-
trolling for aggregate and bank-level determinants of credit spreads.
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Figure 5: Bank funding costs
Note: The left axis represents deposit interest rates and the right axis represents bank CDS and sovereign bond
yield spreads. Both axes are in basis points. Deposit interest rates refer to time deposits of all agreed maturities
and amounts (new business). Bank CDS spreads refer to the implied CDS spread measure in Bloomberg. There
is no available deposit interest rate data for Greece. Source: Bloomberg, ECB, OECD.
3 A two period model
I consider a stylized model of small open nancial economy with three private agents: house-
holds, banks and rms, and a government issuing default-risky debt. Events unfold over two
time periods (see Figure 6 for a graphical timeline). In the rst period, banks collect deposits
from households and use these funds, along with their own net worth, for domestic sovereign
bonds purchases and working capital lending to rms, which in turn produce the consumption
good. In the second period, sovereign default occurs if fundamentals turn out to be weak with
(exogenous) probability P .
Borensztein and Panizza (2009) and Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) nd that sovereign defaults
are often accompanied with banking crises while Yeyati and Panizza (2011) attribute a large
portion of the output costs of default to anticipation e¤ects that precede the default event
itself. Motivated by this empirical evidence, I focus on the nancial interactions that take
13
Table 1: Correlation with sovereign bond yield spreads over 2010-2015
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Bank CDS spreads 0:85 0:93 0:93 0:85 0:93
Deposit interest rates   0:84 0:84 0:74 0:37
Figure 6: Timeline
place under sovereign default risk and abstain from an explicit treatment of the processes that
drive governments to default on their debt, which may include a range of economic and political
factors.13
Sovereign default reduces the productivity of rms. As a result, banks receive a low return
from their lending to rms as well as their domestic sovereign bond holdings under sovereign
default. This reects the costs of domestic sovereign default on bank balance sheets, which hit
them independently of their sovereign bond holdings.14 If banks are left with insu¢ cient funds
to pay the promised return to their depositors, they become insolvent under limited liability
and a haircut proportionate to their funding shortfall is imposed on deposits.15
Bankssolvency prospects in the event of sovereign default are determined by the strategy
13See also Broner et al. (2014), Bocola (2016) and Brunnermeier et al. (2016) for other studies which analyse
the nancial e¤ects of sovereign default without explicitly modelling the causes thereof.
14For other studies which rely on output costs of default, see e.g. Cole and Kehoe (2000), Arellano (2008)
and Aguiar et al. (2015).
15The absence of risk-free assets among banksinvestment opportunities serves only to simplify the exposition.
Their inclusion would be completely inconsequential in this set up as purchasing a safe asset is either equivalent
to or less protable than a reduction in deposits by the same amount.
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their managers adopt in the rst period. The safe strategyconsists of investing in a precau-
tionary manner that leaves them solvent after sovereign default, whereas the gambling strategy
leads to insolvency. Bank managers nd it optimal to follow the strategy that maximizes their
expected payo¤.
A key friction in the model is the limited transparency of bank balance sheets. Specically,
households observe the amount of deposits collected by banks but not their exposure to domestic
sovereign bonds, which can be obscured through the use of shell corporations and/or complex
nancial instruments. This leads to a two-way relationship between the optimal strategies of
bank managers and households. When households anticipate that banks follow a gambling
strategy, their optimal deposit schedule changes in a manner that increases banksincentives
to gamble. Household expectations about bank risk-taking may then become self-fullling.
Finally, before I explain these activities in more detail, it is convenient to describe some
notational conventions. Table 2 provides a list of variables and parameters. Deposits, sovereign
bonds, loans and safe assets are respectively labelled as (d; b; l; d) and take the form of discount
bonds with prices
 
q; qb; ql; q

.16 The recovery rates of (d; b; l) under sovereign default are 
; b; l

. An underbar denotes variables at the state with sovereign default such that A is
productivity under sovereign default. Aggregate quantities, such as aggregate loans L, are in
the upper case while lower case variables pertain to an individual bank.
3.1 Agents and their optimal strategies
3.1.1 Government
In the rst period, the government issues discount bonds b at a price qb. Sovereign bonds are
internationally traded and their marginal buyers are deep pocketed foreign investors. As such,
they are priced at their expected return
qb =
 
1  P + Pb q (1)
where b 2 (0; 1) is their recovery rate and q is the price of an international safe asset d with
perfectly elastic supply. In a monetary union setting, 1=q can be interpreted as the interest
rate set by the common central bank.
16This helps simplify the exposition without any actual impact on the model mechanisms.
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Table 2: Notation
Variables
Label Description
d Deposits
b Domestic sovereign bonds
l Loans to rms
d Safe assets
q; ql; qb; q Asset prices
; l; b Recovery rates
H Labour supply
w Wages
K Working capital
Y Output
n Bank net worth
 Bank prots
v Bank expected payo¤
 Sovereign bond exposure
c Consumption
l Loans market mark-up
d Deposit market mark-up
Parameters
Label Description
P Probability of sovereign default
 Market share of banks
A Productivity
 Cobb-Douglas elasticity
 Discount factor
E Household endowment
3.1.2 Firms
Firms are perfectly competitive. In order to produce the consumption good Y , they hire labour
H from households at a wage w and borrow working capital
K = qlL (2)
from the domestic banking sector. In the interest of a clear exposition, loans to rms take
the form of discount bonds L sold at a price ql. Under a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function, the representative rms prot maximization problem is
max
K;L;H;H
(1  P ) AKH1    L  wH+ P AKH1    lL  wH
subject to (2), where A is productivity and l is the recovery rate of loans. Crucially,
 
ql; L;K

are not state contingent as rms borrow in advance. When the government defaults, loans
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become non-performing due to the productivity decline A < A and banks claim the rms
revenues net of salary payments such that17
l =
AKH1    wH
L
Combining this with the rst order conditions of the rms problem yields the expressions
w = (1  )AK
w = (1  )AK
ql =

1
A
 1

L
1 
 (3)
l =
A
A
where labour supply is perfectly inelastic and normalized to H = H = 1. Of particular
importance are the last two expressions, which respectively establish an upward-sloping loan
supply schedule and pin down the recovery rate.
3.1.3 Households
There is a unit continuum of risk neutral households with an initial endowment E. They save
by purchasing risk-free assets D at a price q or deposits D from domestic banks at a price
q.18 ;19 The representative households utility maximization problem can be described as follows
max
c1;c2;c2;D;D
 u (c1) +  [(1  P )u (c2) + Pu (c2)]
17This is the reduced-form outcome of a re-negotiation game between rms and banks after loans become
non-performing. As rms are perfectly competitive and banks have market power, the latter extracts all of the
remaining revenues after salary payments. Implicitly, this relies on the absence of information asymmetries,
which can be motivated by relationship banking. This also makes it prohibitively costly for households and
foreign entities to lend directly to rms. The domestic banking sector thus acts as a nancial intermediary that
channels funds to rms. Note that the outcome here is equivalent to the issuance of state-contingent debt by
rms.
18The assumption of risk neutrality only serves to attain a tractable expression for the deposit demand
schedule. The results presented below retain their validity under risk aversion, which is introduced in section 4.
19D can be interpreted as deposits in a safe foreign bank or simply as a safe real asset. As there is a unit
continuum of homogenous households, individual householdsdeposits are identical to the aggregate quantities.
I abuse notation by using the aggregate terms (D;D) to describe the households problem.
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subject to the period budget constraints
c1 + qD + q
D = E
c2 = D +D
 + w
c2 = D +D
 + w
where  is the rate at which households discount future consumption and  is the recovery rate
of domestic bank deposits under sovereign default. This yields the rst order conditions
q =  (4)
q = (1  P + P) q (5)
which indicate that domestic deposits are priced at their expected return relative to the safe
asset. Observe that householdsvaluation of domestic deposits increases in recovery rate .
I provide an expression for  in the next section before deriving the optimal deposit demand
schedule of households in section 3.1.5.
3.1.4 Banks
The domestic banking sector is imperfectly competitive in the manner of Cournot. Each bank
is risk neutral with a market share  2 (0; 1]. The representative bank nances its domestic
sovereign bond purchases and lending to rms with deposits collected from households as well
as its own net worth n  0. Its budget constraint can be written as
n+ qd = qbb+ qll (6)
where l = L, d = D represent lending and deposits at individual bank level. Prots are
contingent on sovereign default as follows
 = max f0; l + b  dg (7)
 = max

0; ll + bb  d	 (8)
where  represents prots in the event of sovereign default, and the maximum operators reect
limited liability. Banks always make a strictly positive prot under strong fundamentals ( > 0)
but may become reliant on limited liability after sovereign default. This leads to insolvency,
with losses passed on to depositors through a haircut on deposits. The recovery rate of deposits
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reects the banks shortfall of funds20
 = min

1;
ll + bb
d

(9)
with  < 1 indicating that limited liability binds.
The representative bank chooses its deposits d, domestic sovereign bond purchases b and
loans l in order to maximize its expected payo¤
v = (1  P )  + P
subject to the budget constraint. Note that choosing (b; l) is equivalent to selecting the share
of funds  2 [0; 1] spent on domestic sovereign bonds purchases. Using (6), (b; l) can be dened
in terms of  as
b = 

n+ qd
qb

(10)
l = (1  )

n+ qd
ql

(11)
It is convenient for the remainder of the text to express the recovery rate  in terms of
sovereign exposure 
 =

1 for d  d ()
 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql
  
n
d
+ q

for d > d ()
(12)
d () =

 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql

n
1  q

 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql
 (13)
where d () represents the threshold of deposits above which the bank becomes insolvent fol-
lowing sovereign default.21 Observe that d () and  are positively related to bank net worth n
and the rate of return  
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql
on bank funds.
Recall from the previous section that the price of deposits q increases in . Under imperfect
competition, banks internalize the e¤ects of their actions on  and hence q. As such, it is
necessary to determine the households optimal deposit demand schedule in the next section
before evaluating bank strategies in section 3.1.6.
20There is no deposit insurance or bailot guarantees in the baseline model. These are evaluated as policy
interventions in section 6.
21This can also be interpreted as a leverage threshold d () =n. The claim that  < 1 for d > d () is valid
under the parameter restrictions discussed in the next section.
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3.1.5 Deposit demand schedule
Combining (5) with (12) yields the households optimal deposit demand schedule contingent
on 
q (; d) =
q for d  d ()
q
1 P+P

 
b
qb
+(1 ) l
ql

n
d
1 qP

 
b
qb
+(1 ) l
ql
 for d > d () (14)
where d () is dened by (13). The deposit demand schedule is downward sloping and negatively
related to  under the parameter restrictions
 (1  P )
 (1  P ) +  (1  ) >
A
A
>
b
 +  (1  ) (15)
These restrictions ensure that in the event of sovereign default, the rate of return from
lending to rms falls short of the promised return on deposits but exceeds that of domestic
sovereign bond purchases. When the rst inequality is satised, the bank becomes insolvent
after sovereign default when d > d () and the deposit demand schedule is downward sloping in
this region. Therefore, I refer to d > d () as the riskyregion of the deposit demand schedule
and d  d () as the safe region. In the safe region, deposits are deemed to be risk-free with
 = 1 by households and priced on par with safe assets q = q. Conversely, in the risky region,
households price deposits at a discount q < q in anticipation of a haircut following sovereign
default ( < 1). At the limit d ! 1, the recovery rate tends to the rate of return on bank
funds and the value of deposits approaches the lower bound
lim
d!1
q (; d) = q
1  P
1  qP

 
b
qb
+ (1  ) l
ql

The second inequality in (15) establishes a negative relationship between the sovereign bond
exposure  and the rate of return on bank funds. This ensures that the deposit threshold d ()
shifts inwards in response to a rise in , while the risky region of the deposit demand schedule
pivots downward. Figure 7 shows the e¤ect of a rise in sovereign exposure from an arbitrary
level s to g > s on the deposit demand schedule.
When bank balance sheets are completely transparent, bank managers internalize the neg-
ative relationship between sovereign exposures and their funding conditions. Lemma 1 shows
that this imposes market discipline and deters banks from gambling on domestic sovereign
bonds.
Lemma 1 When households can observe both (d; ), limited liability has no impact on banks
optimal strategy.
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Figure 7: Deposit Demand Schedule
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.22
Along with the parameter restrictions, a necessary assumption to attain the results described
below is some opacity in bank balance sheets such that households can observe the amount of
deposits d collected by banks but not the domestic sovereign bond exposure . As a result,
banks cannot commit to a certain level of exposure.23
I elaborate further on the formation of household expectations on  in section 3.2.2. This
discussion builds upon optimal bank strategies, however, which necessitates their explanation in
advance. In the meantime, both the deposit demand schedule and the bank strategies described
in the next section should be taken to be contingent on household expectations about sovereign
exposure, which I label as ~. Lacking commitment, banks take ~ as given and do not internalize
the impact of their sovereign exposure on the deposit demand schedule q (~; d) facing them.
3.1.6 Bank strategies
Limited liability creates a discontinuity in the representative banks optimal strategy such that
it can be evaluated as a choice between two distinct strategies. Under a safe strategy(labelled
as s), the bank satises a solvency constraint
d  ll + bb (16)
22The Technical Appendix is available online at https://sites.google.com/site/anlari/les/Technical_Appendix
23The same outcome can be attained with a timing friction whereby banks collect deposits rst and then
determine their exposure .
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which ensures that it does not rely on limited liability after sovereign default. The gambling
strategy(labelled as g), on the other hand, results in the banks insolvency and the imposition
of a haircut on deposits after sovereign default.
In the rst period, the representative bank adopts the strategy that maximizes its expected
payo¤ such that the safe strategy is preferred when
vs  vg
where (vs; vg) are respectively the expected payo¤s associated with safe and gambling strategies.
Gambling strategy When the bank follows the gambling strategy, it solves the problem
vg = max
d;2[0;1]
(1  P ) (l + b  d) (17)
s.t.
n+ qd = qbb+ qll
where (10) and (11) map the choice of  into (l; b). Since limited liability binds after sovereign
default, the bank only internalizes the payo¤ in the state with strong fundamentals. It also
internalizes the deposit demand and loan supply schedules
q  q (~; d) (18)
ql =

1
A
 1

(l + (1  )L) 1  (19)
given by (14) and (3) due to imperfect competition.24
The rst order conditions can then be written as
qb = (1  d (~; d)) q (20)
ql = (1  l) qs (21)
where d (~; d) and l are the mark-ups the bank enjoys in the deposit and loan markets due
24(19) di¤ers slightly from (3) as it is from the perspective of an individual bank. L represents aggregate
bank lending which is taken as given by the representative bank.
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to its market power. They are dened as25
d (~; d)   
@q (~; d)
@d
d
q
=
0 for d  d (~)
P

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql

n
d
1 P+P

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql

n
d
for d > d (~)
(22)
l 
 (1  )
 +  (1  ) (23)
Observe that the recovery rates
 
b; l

do not feature in the rst order conditions, since
the bank does not internalize its payo¤ under sovereign default. I elaborate further on the
consequences of this while considering the gambling equilibrium in section 3.2.1.
Safe strategy Under the safe strategy, the banks problem di¤ers from its gambling
counterpart in two respects. First, as the bank does not rely on limited liability, the objective
function internalizes the payo¤ in both states of nature such that
vs = max
d;2[0;1]
(1  P )  + P
= max
d;2[0;1]
(1  P ) (l + b) + P  ll + bb  d
Second, this is subject to an occasionally binding solvency constraint given by (16) in addition
to the budget constraint. The rst order conditions for the safe strategy can then be written
as
 
ll + bb  d = 0 ,   0 , d  ll + bb (24)
qb 
 
1  P + Pb+ b
1 + 
(1  d (~; d)) q (25)
ql =
 
1  P + Pl+ l
1 + 
(1  l) (1  d (~; d)) q (26)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the solvency constraint and (24) is the corresponding
complementary slackness condition. Compared to the gambling case, the bank has a lower
valuation for both b and l since it internalizes the low payo¤ from these assets in the state
with sovereign default. When l > b, however, greater value is placed on loans compared to
domestic sovereign bonds relative to the gambling case. Both of these e¤ects are amplied
when the solvency constraint is binding such that  > 0.
The weak inequality in (25) reects the possibility that the bank may prefer not to pur-
25Observe that there is no deposit market mark-up in the safe region of the deposit demand schedule. This
is because banks face a horizontal deposit demand schedule in this region as their deposits become perfectly
substitutable with safe assets.
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chase any domestic sovereign bonds ( = 0), since the sovereign bond price is xed at qb = 
1  P + Pb q as explained in section 3.1.1.26 Lemma 2 describes the conditions under
which (25) holds with equality.
Lemma 2 When  = 0 and q = q, condition (25) holds with equality and reduces to
qb =
 
1  P + Pb q (27)
and there is an interior solution for b within the range
b 2

0;
q d (~) + n  qll
qb

(28)
Otherwise, there is a strict inequality and a corner solution
qb >
 
1  P + Pb+ b
1 + 
(1  d (~; d)) q
b = 0
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
This indicates that the bank only purchases a positive amount of sovereign bonds b > 0
when the solvency constraint is slack with  = 0 and bank deposits are at the safe region of the
deposit demand schedule such that q = q. In this case, (27) shows that the banks valuation
of sovereign bonds is at their expected payo¤, which is equivalent to their market price given
by (1). The bank is thus indi¤erent to the amount of its domestic sovereign bond purchases
within the range (28). When the solvency constraint binds ( > 0) and/or bank deposits are
considered to be risky (q < q), on the other hand, the bank does not purchase any domestic
sovereign bonds.
In the next section, I characterize two candidate equilibria and determine the conditions
under which they are self-conrming.
3.2 Equilibrium
I solve for a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium which requires that all optimality
conditions and constraints of banks, rms and households are satised, and household expec-
26Implicitly, this is a complementary slackness condition for an occassionally binding non-negativity constraint
b  0. This constraint never binds under the gambling strategy due to the higher valuation of domestic sovereign
bonds. An equivalent constraint for lending (l  0) is also slack at all times since ql declines in response to a
fall in l.
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tations on sovereign exposure ~ are conrmed in the equilibrium.27 Section 3.2.1 characterizes
the candidate equilibria. Section 3.2.2 describes how households formulate their expectations
~. Section 3.2.3 provides the equilibrium conditions as well as an intuitive demonstration of
the mechanism behind multiple equilibria. Finally, section 3.2.4 formally characterizes the
equilibrium regions.
3.2.1 Candidate equilibria
In a rational expectations framework, two candidate equilibria emerge: a gambling equilibrium
where household expectations of high exposure to domestic sovereign bonds in the banking
sector is conrmed by the adoption of a gambling strategy by banks, and a safe equilibrium
where the opposite is true. With a slight abuse of notation, I use the labels gand sto refer
to variables pertaining to the gambling and safe equilibria.
Gambling equilibrium Under the gambling equilibrium, banks follow the rst order
conditions (20) and (21). The sovereign exposure g, which must be consistent with household
expectations ~, is determined by combining (20) with the deposit demand schedule (14). This
yields
g ! 1 (29)
qg = q
b
where the main takeaway is the co-movement between the value of deposits qg and sovereign
bond prices qb. Note that the corner solution is due to the risk neutrality of households. In
section 4, I show that risk aversion leads to an interior solution g 2 (0; 1), qg 2
 
qb; q

while
preserving the co-movement property.28
The second condition (21) pins down the price and quantity of loans purchased by the
representative bank as
qlg = (1  l) qb (30)
lg =  (A)
1
1  ql

1 
g (31)
27I abstain from mixed equilibria, as this would complicate the model solution signicantly without yielding
any interesting insights in addition to those provided by analyzing symmetric equilibria. Note also that the
candidate equilibria described here, and the conditions under which they are valid, would remain unchanged
even when mixed equilibria are taken into account.
28Under risk neutrality, bank deposits are priced at their expected value and the curvature of the deposit
demand schedule is such that the mark-up d (~; d) tends to zero as deposits increase. Therefore, under a
gambling strategy, banks nd it protable to issue more deposits and use the funds to purchase domestic
sovereign bonds until their anticipated exposure is g = 1.
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where aggregate loans is given by Lg = lg=. Since the bank only internalizes asset payo¤s in
the state with no sovereign default, a rise in sovereign default probability P (which reduces qb)
leads to a decline in bank lending. This reects the crowding out of bank lending by domestic
sovereign bond purchases.
Finally, the expected payo¤ of banks under the gambling equilibrium is given by
vg = (1  P )llg +
n
q
(32)
where the rst term reects the mark-up from lending and the second term is the expected
return on the banksinitial net worth.
Figure 8 provides a graphical depiction of the gambling equilibrium, where the red line
represents the banks optimal deposit supply schedule under a gambling strategy and Eg marks
the equilibrium allocation.29
Figure 8: Gambling Equilbrium
Note: The deposit supply curve is attained by combining (19)-(22).
Deposit demand stems from the combination of (14) and (29).
29Observe that the rate of change in the deposit supply schedule changes direction. This occurs at qg =
qlg= [(1  l) (1  d (~; d))]. Until this point, the bank invests only in lending to rms. By virtue of diminishing
returns to scale in the production function, ql increases at an increasing rate and so does the deposit supply
schedule. Beyond this point, however, the bank invests additional funds in domestic sovereign bonds and the
deposit supply schedule is guided by (20). The relationship between d (~; d) and d then gives the schedule a
positive, but decreasing rate of change that tends to zero at qg = qb.
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Safe Equilibrium Under the safe equilibrium, the deposit threshold d (s) coincides with
the solvency constraint (16) such that banks always remain within the safe region of the deposit
demand schedule with qs = q. The rst order conditions can then be written as
qb 
 
1  P + Pb+ b
1 + 
q (33)
ql =
 
1  P + Pl+ l
1 + 
(1  l) q (34)
It follows from Lemma 2 that there are two possible cases of the safe equilibrium, one where
the solvency constraint is slack and another where it binds. Lemma 3 characterizes the safe
equilibrium under both of these cases.
Lemma 3 There are two cases of the safe equilibrium
Case 1 When n  nc 
 
qls   ql

ls, the solvency constraint is slack ( = 0) and (33) holds
with equality. The safe equilibrium is then characterized by30
qls =
 
1  P + Pl (1  l) q (35)
ls =  (A)
1
1  ql

1 
s (36)
bs 2
"
0;
n   qls   ql ls
qb   qb
#
(37)
ds =
qbbs + q
lls   n
q
s =
qbbs
qds + n
(38)
vs =
 
1  P + Pllls + nq (39)
Case 2 When n < nc, the solvency constraint binds ( > 0) and the safe equilibrium is char-
acterized by
qlls =

1

 1 


ls
A
 1

  n (40)
qls =

1
A
 1


ls

 1 

bs = s = 0 (41)
ds = 
lls
vs = (1  P )
 
1  l ls (42)
30In the deniton for nc,
 
qls; ls

correspond to (35), (36)
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where the parameter restrictions (15) are su¢ cient to show that
@ls
@n
> 0 8 n < nc
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
Figure 9 represents the two cases graphically. In the rst case, banks value assets according
to their expected return since they do not face a binding constraint or expect to rely on limited
liability. The equilibrium price of loans is then given by (35). As explained in section 3.1.6,
banks are indi¤erent to the amount of their sovereign bond purchases within a range given by
(37), because their valuation of these bonds coincides with their market price. Consistent with
this, there is also a range of admittable equilibrium values for (ds; s). In Figure 9, this is
depicted by the overlapping region Es between the deposit demand and supply curves. In order
to pin down these variables in equilibrium, I select the upper bound of (37) as the equilibrium
value for bs. This amounts to eliminating a range of safe equilibria with lower (bs; s) values
without any impact on the characteristics of the equilibrium outcome.31
Figure 9: Safe Equilbrium
Note: The deposit supply curve is attained by combining (3) with (34) and (34). Deposit
demand stems from the combination of (14) and (38).
In the second case, the binding solvency constraint creates a wedge between the demand and
supply of deposits. Therefore, banks do not nd it optimal to purchase any domestic sovereign
bonds and the equilibrium quantity of loans is implicitly dened by (40). A rise in net worth
n relaxes the solvency constraint, leading to a rise in the price and quantity of loans.
31The parameter regions under which the safe equilibrium with the selected bs value exists fully encompasses
that of safe equilibria with lower bs values. In other words, whenever the safe equilibria with lower bs values
exist, so does the selected equilibrium, which is identical to them in all other aspects.
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Finally, it is worth discussing bank lending in the context of safe and gambling equilibria.
Proposition 1 outlines the conditions under which a gambling equilibrium is associated with
lower bank lending.
Proposition 1 Bank lending is lower in a gambling equilibrium under the conditions
l > b
n >

1

 1 


lg
A
 1

  qllg
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
The rst condition pertains to banks risk-taking incentives. In a gambling equilibrium,
sovereign default drives the banking sector into insolvency. Because of limited liability, banks
then cease to internalize the payo¤ of assets in the state with sovereign default. When the
recovery rate of loans exceeds that of domestic sovereign bonds, this leads to the crowding out
of bank lending by domestic sovereign bond purchases.
In spite of this, bank lending is higher under the gambling equilibrium when net worth
falls short of the level required to satisfy the second condition. In this case, a tight solvency
constraint forces banks to reduce their lending below the gambling level in order to ensure
their solvency following sovereign default. Note that as the recovery rate l of loans increases,
the second condition is satised at a wider range of net worth, while crowding out e¤ects get
stronger.
3.2.2 Sentiments
Recall from section 3.1.5 that bankssovereign exposure  is unobservable. Nevertheless, it is
a key determinant of their solvency prospects and hence the optimal deposit demand schedule
q (; d). In this section, I describe how households formulate their expectations ~ about banks
sovereign exposures. This is equivalent to forming an expectation about bank strategy since
(29), (38), (41) establish a one-to-one mapping between the two conditional on the observables
(n; d).
Figure 7 shows the deposit demand schedules associated with the expectation of safe (~ =
s) and gambling (~ = g) strategies. Observe that households may infer the bank strategy
from the level of deposits d when it lies outside the range d 2 ( d  g ; d (s)]. When d  d  g,
banks remain solvent after sovereign default even when their exposure is at a level associated
with the gambling strategy. As such, banks cannot possibly follow a gambling strategy when
their deposits remain within this region. Similarly, even the low exposure s associated with
the safe strategy leads to insolvency when deposits exceed d (s) such that d > d (s) is not
consistent with a safe strategy.
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In contrast, within the non-veriableregion d 2 ( d  g ; d (s)], it is not possible to deduce
the bank strategy from observables. Expectations about the sovereign exposure ~ are instead
determined by household sentiments such that good sentimentsrefer to the expectation of a
safe strategy and bad sentimentsrefer to that of a gambling strategy. Figure 10 displays the
deposit demand schedule under each type of sentiments. As I solve for a rational expectations
equilibrium, sentiments can only exist when they are self-conrming in equilibrium.
Figure 10: Sentiments
3.2.3 Equilibrium conditions
Under the rational expectations equilibrium framework described in section 3.2.1, the safe equi-
librium exists when the representative bank nds it optimal to follow a safe strategy provided
that there are good sentiments and other banks also follow a safe strategy. This leads to the
equilibrium condition
vs  vgjs (43)
where vs is the representative banks expected payo¤ in the safe equilibrium given in Lemma 3
and vgjs is the expected payo¤ from a deviation to the gambling strategy. I refer to vgjs as a
deviation payo¤ since it describes the expected payo¤ from adopting a gambling strategy when
sentiments and other banksstrategies are consistent with a safe equilibrium.
Similarly, the gambling equilibrium exists under the equilibrium condition
vg  vsjg (44)
where vg is the expected payo¤ under the gambling equilibrium given by (32) and vsjg is the
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expected payo¤ from a deviation to the safe strategy. I elaborate further on these deviations
below.
There are three possible equilibrium outcomes. First, when (43) is satised and (44) is
not, banks follow a safe strategy regardless of household sentiments and there is a unique safe
equilibrium. In this case, bad sentiments are not self-conrming and thus may not exist. In
contrast, when (44) is satised and (43) is violated, there is a unique gambling equilibrium
and only bad sentiments exist. Finally, when both conditions are satised, banks follow a safe
strategy under good sentiments and gamble under bad sentiments such that there are multiple
equilibria.
I use Figure 11 as an informal example to provide further intuition about the mechanism
behind multiple equilibria. In the interest of a clear exposition, I focus on a case where the
solvency constraint remains slack regardless of household sentiments.32 Under good sentiments,
the representative bank faces the deposit demand schedule depicted by the dotted line, where
the deposit threshold d (s) is consistent with a safe strategy. This permits the bank to raise
su¢ cient deposits to satisfy its optimality condition for lending (35) without reducing the price
of its deposits below the risk-free level q under a safe strategy. It then nds it optimal to adopt
a safe strategy such that there is a safe equilibrium Es and good sentiments are conrmed.
When there is a shift to bad sentiments, the expectation of a high sovereign exposure g > s
leads to an inward shift of the deposit threshold to d
 
g

< d (s). The deposit demand
schedule then pivots downward in the non-veriable region d 2 ( d  g ; d (s)]. Because of
this deterioration in the banks borrowing conditions, the quantity and price of deposits fall
to Esjg under the safe strategy. This leads to a decline in the expected payo¤ associated with
this strategy. If the bank nds it optimal to deviate to a gambling strategy that leads to the
outcome Eg, bad sentiments are also conrmed and there are multiple equilibria.
Below, I briey describe the deviations to gambling and safe strategies before characterizing
the parameter boundaries for the three equilibrium regions (with a unique safe equilibrium, a
unique gambling equilibrium, and multiplicity) in section 3.2.4.
Deviation to the gambling strategy Consider a deviation to the gambling strategy
when sentiments and other banksstrategies correspond to the safe equilibrium in section 3.2.1.
Under such a deviation, the banks strategy is guided by the rst order conditions (20) and
(21), yielding valuations for deposits and loans that are consistent with a gambling equilibrium.
32This mechanism becomes even stronger when the solvency constraint binds, since the downward pivot in
the deposit demand schedule under bad sentiments leads to a tightening of the solvency constraint as shown in
the third panel of Figure 12.
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Figure 11: Example with Multiple Equilibria
However, the quantity of loans purchased by the deviating bank
lgjs =
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1    1  

ls (45)
di¤ers from its gambling equilibrium counterpart, which is given by (31). This is because the
remaining banks each purchase an amount ls consistent with the safe equilibrium, thus driving
up loan prices. The negative relationship between lgjs and ls follows directly from the upward-
sloping loan supply schedule. As other banks provide more loans, the scope for lending by
the deviating bank diminishes. This also reduces the expected payo¤ from deviation which is
increasing in bank lending as in the gambling equilibrium
vgjs = (1  P )llgjs +
n
q
(46)
Lemma 4 builds upon this intuition to show that the safe equilibrium is always satised when
the solvency constraint is slack.
Lemma 4 The parameter restrictions given by (15) are su¢ cient to show that
vs > vgjs 8 n  nc
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
Recall from Lemma 3 that ls is increasing in net worth n when the solvency constraint
binds. It is thus possible for (43) to be violated at a level of net worth below nc such that there
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is a unique gambling equilibrium. I elaborate further on this in section 3.2.4 after describing
deviations to the safe strategy.
Deviation to the safe strategy Under a deviation to the safe strategy, the bank follows
the rst order conditions (24)-(26) but faces a deposit demand schedule
q
 
g; d

=

q for d  d  g
qb + P
b
1 P
n
d
for d > d
 
g
 (47)
d
 
g

=
b
qb   bqn
consistent with bad sentiments. As the banks actual sovereign exposure diverges from house-
hold expectations, the solvency constraint no longer corresponds to the deposit threshold d
 
g

.
This opens up the possibility that the bank may move to the risky region of the deposit demand
schedule despite satisfying the solvency constraint.
There are thus three possible cases of the deviation to the safe strategy which are valid at
di¤erent regions of bank net worth n. In the interest of brevity, I relegate the characterization
of these cases to Appendix A and instead provide a brief description of each case with the aid of
Figure 12. In the rst case, the deviating bank has a slack solvency constraint and remains in
the safe region of the deposit threshold dsjg  d
 
g

. This case is nearly identical to case 1 of
the safe equilibrium, except for a rise in the boundary level of net worth required for this case to
be valid to nrjg > nc due to the inwards shift of the deposit threshold under bad sentiments.33
In the second case, the shift to bad sentiments leaves the optimal level of deposits in the
risky region of the deposit demand schedule, while the actual solvency constraint remains
slack. The decline in the value of deposits to qsjg < q leads to a fall in bank lending and
expected payo¤. Finally, in the third case, the solvency constraint binds, creating a wedge
between deposit demand and deposit supply and further reducing lending and expected payo¤.
Note that the solvency constraint, which is given by
 
qlsjg   q
 
g; dsjg

l

lsjg = n (48)
tightens in response to a decline in the price of deposits.
3.2.4 Regions of equilibria
There are three possible equilibrium outcomes to the model. First, there is a unique gambling
equilibrium when banks follow a gambling strategy regardless of household sentiments. Second,
33See Appendix A for a denition for nrjg.
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Figure 12: Deviation to the Safe Strategy
Note: Deposit demand is attained by combining (14) with (38) under good sentiments and (29) under bad
sentiments. The deposit supply curve stems from the combination of (3), (25), (26) and (47). The solvency
constraint is given by (48).
there are multiple equilibria if banks adopt a safe strategy under good sentiments and a gambling
strategy under bad sentiments such that both good and bad sentiments are self-fullling. Third,
there is a unique safe equilibrium when banks follow a safe strategy regardless of household
sentiments. I denote the regions of parameters where these outcomes are prevalent as G, M
and S respectively.
Proposition 2 expresses the equilibrium conditions (43), (44) as parameter boundaries for
these regions.
Proposition 2 Under the parameter restrictions given by (15), the mapping of equilibrium
regions across net worth n is given by
E (n) =
8>>><>>>:
G if n  n
M if n < n < n
S if n > n
(49)
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where n < nc is implicity dened by the expression
n =

1

 1 

 
1
A
q (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n
q (1  P ) 1  l + l 1  
! 1

(50)
 l q
 (1  P )l
 
qlg
 
1  (A)
1
1  + n
(1  P )  1  l+ l 1  
and n is given by
n  (1  P ) q

P
h
(1  P ) + Pl (1  )   1  P + Pl 11 i  (1  l) qb 1  (A) 11  l (51)
under the su¢ cient conditions  2 (0; 1
2
],  2 (0; 1
2
].
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
Note that (49) indicates a monotonic ordering of equilibria across bank net worth n. Since
n < nc, there is no overlap betweenM and the case of the safe equilibrium with a slack solvency
constraint. Without an upper bound to bank net worth n, this is su¢ cient to show that S is
non-empty. Proposition 3 describes the conditions under which fG;Mg are also non-empty.
Proposition 3 Under the parameter restrictions given by (15), the non-emptiness of regions
fG;Mg depends on where l stands with respect to the boundary l, which is implicitly dened
by the expression
(1  ) +  1  
l
l
=
 
(1  l)
 
1  P + Pb
l
! 
1 
(52)
There are two possible cases.
Case 1 If l  l, G is empty andM is always non-empty.
Case 2 If l < l, G is non-empty and a su¢ cient condition forM to be non-empty is
b
 + (1  )  > 1  P + P
b (53)
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
4 The dynamic model
In this section, I extend the two-period model to a recursive-dynamic setting with risk averse
households and sovereign risk shocks. Figure 13 shows the recursive timeline. The vector S
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collects the value of aggregate state variables (to be dened explicitly later on) in the current
period and S0 denotes the state vector for the next period. Sovereign default is incorporated
into the model as an absorbing state. In each period, the government defaults with probability
P (S). Once the government defaults, there is no more sovereign default risk in future periods
and the model economy moves to a steady state S where the continuation values
 
vh; vb

of
banks and households depend on S.
Figure 13: Recursive timeline
In the interest of brevity, I only describe the aspects of the dynamic model that di¤er from
section 3.34 The remainder of the section is organized as follows: First, I describe the process
for sovereign risk, the deposit demand schedule under risk aversion, and the banks recursive
optimization problem. Then I discuss the formulation of household sentiments, dene the
equilibrium concept and characterize the steady state after sovereign default. Finally, I provide
a sketch of the algorithm used for the numerical solution.
4.1 Government
Sovereign bonds are priced at their expected return by deep pocketed foreign investors as in
section 3.1.1. Instead of taking a constant value, however, the sovereign default probability
P (S) is determined by a stochastic scal limit. Let  (S) denote the scal stress faced by the
government. At the beginning of each period, an i.i.d. shock " that follows a standard logistic
distribution determines the governments resolve to avoid default. Sovereign default occurs
when "   (S). The default probability is then given by the logistic function
P (S) =
exp ( (S))
1 + exp ( (S))
(54)
34See the Technical Appendix for a complete specication of the dynamic model
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Note that the stock of government debt B, output Y and the sovereign bond yield 1=qb (S)
may easily be incorporated into the scal stress function  (S) as determinants of sovereign
risk. For the dynamic solution, however, I adopt a simple specication  (S) =  where  follows
the AR(1) process
0 = ss +  (   ss) + "0; "0  N (0; 1) (55)
and "0 is a sovereign risk shock.
My reasons for adopting this specication are threefold. First, recent empirical studies show
that a substantial portion of the movements in sovereign risk premia during the recent sovereign
debt crisis were unrelated to country fundamentals (see e.g. Bahaj, 2014; De Grauwe and Ji,
2012). In line with these ndings, the sovereign risk shock (55) reects non-fundamental factors
such as contagion and self-fullling sentiments in sovereign bond markets.
Second, by adopting this specication I abstain from the feedback loops between sovereign
default risk and domestic fundamentals such as the stock of debt and sovereign bond yields.
Although these feedback loops play a potentially important role in the transmission of sovereign
risk, they have been studied extensively in recent literature (see e.g. Corsetti et al., 2013).
Abstaining from them permits me to isolate the propagation channel of sovereign risk through
bank-depositor interactions. Third, from a computational perspective, abstaining from these
feedback loops reduces the number of state variables.
The law of motion for government debt is given by the governments budget constraint
qb (S)B0 = B +G (S)  T (S)
where T (S) is lump-sum taxation on households and G (S) is government spending. Since B
has no e¤ect on the non-government sector under this specication, the only restriction I place
on the primary surplus G (S) T (S) is that it follows a scal rule that precludes Ponzi games.
4.2 Deposit demand schedule
Households are risk averse with their ow utility u (c) given by a standard CRRA specica-
tion. I relegate the households recursive optimization problem to Appendix B and discuss the
implications of risk aversion for the deposit demand schedule
q (d0; n;S) =
8><>:
q for d0  d (n;S)
q
1 P (S)+P (S) uc(c)
uc(c0)

~(n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+(1 ~(n;S)) l
ql(S)

n
d0
1 qP (S) uc(c)
uc(c0)

~(n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+(1 ~(n;S)) l
ql(S)
 for d0 > d (n;S)
9>=>; , (56)
where d0 is deposits at bank level, uc (:) is marginal utility and (c; c0) are respectively consump-
tion in future states with and without sovereign default. The sovereign exposure anticipated by
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households is denoted by ~ (n;S) and the deposit threshold d (n;S) is identical to its counterpart
in section 3.
Under risk aversion, the marginal utility wedge uc(c)
uc(c0) exceeds unity and increases in d
0.
Compared to the case with risk neutrality, this leads to a small discontinuity in q (d0; n;S)
around the deposit threshold and increases the curvature of the schedule in the risky region
d0 > d (n;S). As a result, there is an interior solution g 2 (0; 1) for sovereign exposure under
the gambling strategy.
4.3 Banks
Each bank is managed by a unit continuum of risk-neutral bankers. From a representative
banks perspective, the timeline of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of
each period, the bank observes the realization of S and collects deposits d0 from households at
a price q (d0; n;S). It uses these deposits, along with its accumulated net worth n to purchase
domestic sovereign bonds b and loans l from rms at prices qb (S) and ql (l;S), thereby selecting
its sovereign exposure .
Next, the bank learns whether the government is in default. The payo¤ from (b; l) and
hence the banks prots are contingent on the sovereign default realization
 = l + b  d0 (57)
 = max
 
ll + bb  d0; 0 (58)
such that the bank may be rendered insolvent by sovereign default. Bankers have limited
liability, so when the bank becomes insolvent, all of its bankers exit the economy with zero
payo¤. When the bank is solvent, on the other hand, a randomly determined but constant
portion (1   ) of its bankers exit and consume their share of the prots.35 The remaining
prots are accumulated as net worth in the next period, according to the law of motion
n0 =  (   !) (59)
n0 =  (   !) (60)
where ! represents overhead costs.36
35The number of banks, and the bankers that manage them are constant over time. Insolvent banks are
replaced with a new bank that has zero net worth. Bankers that exit from solvent banks are replaced with new
bankers which do not contribute to net worth.
36The consumption of portion (1   ) of prots and overhead costs ! serve to prevent the accumulation of
innite net worth by banks in the steady state after sovereign default. The former aspect is standard in dynamic
nancial models while the latter is necessitated by the excess prots banks make due to imperfect competition.
Overhead costs are waived when  < ! so as to ensure that they never drive the bank into insolvency or a¤ect
the recovery rate  on deposits.
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Limited liability creates a discontinuity in the representative banks policy function such
that its decision problem can be written as a choice between two alternative strategies, a safe
strategywhere the bank satises an occasionally binding solvency constraint
d0  ll + bb (61)
and limited liability never binds, and a gambling strategywhich leaves the bank reliant on
limited liability in the event of sovereign default. I denote these with the subscripts s and g.
The representative banks problem can then be written as
vb (n; S) = max

vbs (n; S) ; v
b
g (n; S)
	
, (62)
vbs (n; S) = max
d0;2[0;1]
8<: (1  P (S))
 
(1   )  +  ES

vb (n0; S0)

+P (S)
 
(1   )  +  vb (n0; S)
9=; ,
vbg (n; S) = max
d0;2[0;1]

(1  P (S))  (1   )  +  ES vb (n0; S0)	
subject to (57)-(60) and
qb (S) b+ ql (l;S) l = q (d0; n;S) d0 + n (63)
S0 =   (S)
for both strategies, as well as the solvency constraint (61) for the safe strategy.   (S) is the law
of motion for aggregate state variables, (63) represents the banks budget constraint and vb (:)
is the banks continuation value under sovereign default. Lemma 5 provides an expression for
vb (:).
Lemma 5 The continuation value for solvent banks in the steady state S is
vb (n0;S) =  (64)
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
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The banks rst order conditions under the safe strategy are
 
ll + bb  d0 (n;S) = 0 ,  (n;S)  0 , d0  ll + bb (65)
qb (S) 
(1  P (S))

1   +  @ES[v
b(n0;S0)]
@

+ (P (S) +  (n;S)) b
1 +  (n;S)
(1  d (d0; n;S)) q (d0; n;S)
(66)
ql (l;S)
1  l
=
(1  P (S))

1   +  @ES[v
b(n0;S0)]
@

+ (P (S) +  (n;S)) l
1 +  (n;S)
(1  d (d0; n;S)) q (d0; n;S)
(67)
where (l; d (d
0; n;S)) are the mark-ups in the loan and deposit markets and  (n;S) is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the solvency constraint. The interpretation of these con-
ditions is similar to their counterparts (24)-(26) in section 3.1.6. The two sets of FOCs di¤er
only due to the term
@ES[vb(n0;S0)]
@
which is the expected value of a marginal increase in prots
in the state without sovereign default. In a two-period setting, this term is xed at unity by
the banks risk neutrality. In a dynamic environment, on the other hand, it depends on the
marginal value of net worth in future state realizations S0 via (59). Proposition 4 shows that
the FOCs in section 3.1.6 constitute a special case of the dynamic FOCs.
Proposition 4 Let g be the subset of state realizations where the bank follows a gambling
strategy. If for all possible future aggregate state realizations S0, either (n0; S0) 2 g or (n0; S0) =2
g and  (n0;S0) = 0, q (d0; n0;S0) = q, then
@ES

vb (n0;S0)

@
= 1
Otherwise
@ES

vb (n0;S0)

@
> 1
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
The proposition states that the bank attaches a higher value to future net worth if there is
a positive probability of visiting a future state realization where it follows a safe strategy with
a binding solvency constraint and/or its deposits are perceived to be risky. This increase in the
value attached to  relative to  increases the risk-taking incentives of the bank, leading to a
rise in (b; d0) under the safe strategy when the solvency constraint is slack, as well as stronger
incentives to adopt the gambling strategy.
In contrast, the FOCs under the gambling strategy are identical to their counterparts in
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section 3.1.6.
qb (S) = (1  d (d0; n;S)) q (d0; n;S) (68)
ql (l;S) = (1  l) qb (S) (69)
This is due to the banks reliance on limited liability under sovereign default. Because of this,
the bank only internalizes its prots  in the absence of sovereign default. Since the relative
valuation of (; ) does not matter, the term
@ES[vb(n0;S0)]
@
drops out of the gambling FOCs. In
other words, when a bank follows the gambling strategy, its optimal set of actions are those
that maximize  regardless of its time horizon.
4.4 Sentiments and sunspots
In this section, I describe how households formulate their expectations ~ (n;S) about a banks
domestic sovereign bond exposure. Conditional on (n;S), the banks rst order conditions
(65)-(69) provide a unique mapping between the strategy followed by a bank and its sovereign
exposure.
Using (62), the optimality condition for the bank to adopt a gambling strategy can be
written as
vbg (n; S)  vbs (n; S) (70)
When this condition is satised, the banks optimal exposure g is given by (68), (69). Oth-
erwise, the bank adopts a safe strategy and its exposure s is pinned down by (65)-(67).
Sentiments may become self-fullling due to the dependence of both sides of the inequality in
(70) on ~ (n;S).
The state space for (n;S) can be segmented into three non-intersecting subsets according
to the interaction between (70) and ~ (n;S). Let G denote a subset where (70) is satised for
~ (n;S) =

g; s
	
, S denote a second subset where (70) is violated for ~ (n;S) = g; s	 and
M denote a third subset where (70) is satised for ~ (n;S) = g and violated for ~ (n;S) = s.
In the rst two subsets fG;Sg,  is uniquely determined regardless of ~ (n;S) while household
sentiments become self-fullling when (n;S) 2M.
I resolve the multiplicity inM with the use of sunspots. Specically, let  be a random vari-
able drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval at the beginning of each period and
 2 [0; 1] a constant threshold. When  >  household expectations coordinate on ~ (n;S) = s
consistent with the safe strategy. I refer to this as good sentiments. When   , on the other
hand, expectations coordinate on ~ (n;S) = g in line with the gambling strategy and there
are bad sentiments. To provide a formal denition for ~ (n;S),M is further segmented into
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two subsetsM+ andM  which respectively denote good and bad sentiments such that
~ (n;S) =
8<: g if (n;S) 2 fG;M gs if (n;S) 2 fS;M+g
Since  is uniformly distributed on a unit interval, the probability of good and bad sentiments
in the next period are simply given by
 
1   and  respectively. Note that it is straightforward
to introduce a more sophisticated specication for sunspots by replacing  with an AR(1)
shock process or a function of fundamentals such as the recovery rate  of domestic deposits
or government debt B. I opt for this simple specication as it permits me to isolate the role
of sovereign risk and other relevant fundamentals in making household sentiments self-fullling
in the rst place. The subset M which provides a mapping of states with multiplicity is
endogenously determined by the optimal strategies of households and banks, which in turn
depend on these fundamentals.37
4.5 Steady state after sovereign default
When the government defaults, sovereign bond holders receive a recovery rate b < 1. Produc-
tivity also declines to A < A which leads to a reduction in wages and a partial payment from
loans. If the banks followed a gambling strategy before sovereign default, they become insolvent
such that households receive a recovery rate  from their deposits and the banking sector is
replaced with a new set of banks with zero net worth. Otherwise, deposits are repaid fully and
bank net worth is determined by (60).
In the following period, the economy immediately moves to a steady state S where pro-
ductivity recovers back to A and there is no further sovereign default risk.38 In the absence
of bank insolvency risk, domestic deposits become perfectly substitutable with risk-free assets
37Global games constitutes an alternative approach to sunspots in resolving multiple equilibria that creates an
endogenous relationship between economic fundamentals and equilibrium selection. This approach, however, is
not implementable in the context of the multiplicity considered in this paper since the strategic complementary
is between banks and households rather, and takes place through a market mechanism that is capable of
aggregating diverse beliefs. To see this, consider the introduction of a private signal to households about
~ (n;S). Provided households are not extremely risk averse, the solvency calculus of a household is not a¤ected
by the signal received by other households. Banks then nd it optimal to borrow solely from the household
with the lowest ~ (n;S) signal, which determines the price q (d0; n;S) in deposit markets. The model collapses
to a sunspot solution where the lowest ~ (n;S) signal becomes the de facto sunspot.
38The immediate recovery in productivity only serves to simplify the exposition. This can be replaced with
any continuation path for productivity as long as there is perfect foresight about it.
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such that q = q.39 The steady state price and quantity of loans is then given by
qk = (1  l) q (71)
L = (A)
1
1 
 
qk
 
1 
The following parameterization for ( ; !; q) is necessary to ensure this
 = q = 
! = lL
The parameterization for ( ; !) ensures that bank net worth remains constant while equating
the risk-free asset price to the household discount factor drives households to completely smooth
their consumption after sovereign default.40
4.6 Equilibrium
Let S = [N; ; ;{] be the aggregate state sector, where N = n= is aggregate bank net worth
in equilibrium and { = D + D + w (S)   T (S) is disposable household wealth. A recursive
rational expectations equilibrium is given by value functions for households and banks

vh; vb
	
and policy functions for households fc;D0; D0g and for banks f; d0g such that, given prices
fw;w; qg and price schedules ql; q	: (i) householdsand banksvalue and policy functions
solve their optimization problems; (ii) the market for domestic deposits clears, D0 = d0= (iii)
the market for loans clears L (S) = l=; (iv) the government budget constraint is satised; (v)
  (:) and fG;M;Sg are consistent with agentsoptimal strategies.41
4.7 Numerical solution
The solution for the recursive equilibrium is attained using global numerical methods. In this
section, I sketch the main steps in the algorithm and relegate the remaining details to the
Technical Appendix.
Note that the decentralized, imperfectly competitive nature of banks requires the inclusion
of individual bank net worth n along with S as a state variable. Specically, although banks are
39There is no need take a stance on when and whether the government returns to sovereign bond markets as
long as there is no further default risk. If the government is able to issue bonds, they are priced at qb = q and
banks are indi¤erent to holding them.
40Solving the households problem when q di¤ers from the discount factor  is trivial but leads to a balanced
growth path for consumption rather than a steady state value. I abstain from this since it leads to additional
complication without yielding any insights of interest.
41In the small open economy setting, the markets for goods and sovereign bonds are cleared through trade
with foreign agents. Therefore, there is no need to explicitly include the clearing conditions for these markets
in the equilibrium denition.
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symmetric with net worth n = N on the equilibrium path, determining their optimal strategy
as per section 4.3 requires considering o¤-equilibrium strategies (deviations) which lead to a
di¤erent path of n for the specic bank than the remainder of the banking sector. The banks
value function vb (n; S) and the equilibrium regions fG;M;Sg are thus dened over (n;S).
Let X (S) = f; d0; c;D0; D0g collect the policy functions of banks and households in the
symmetric equilibrium with n = N , and E = fG;M;Sg denote the equilibrium regions. The
solution algorithm can then be sketched as follows
1. Begin with a set of guesses for fE ;  (S) ; X (S)g.
2. Formulate future expectations according to fE ;  (S) ; X (S)g. Then, use the deposit de-
mand schedule in section 4.2, rst order conditions in 4.3, and the market clearing condi-
tions in section 4.6 to update f  (S) ; X (S)g. Iterate until the solution for f  (S) ; X (S)g
converges.
3. Guess the banks value function vb (n; S).
4. Use the rst order conditions in section (4.3), (70) and expectations formulated according
to fE ;  (S) ; X (S)g to update vb (n; S). Iterate until the solution for vb (n; S) converges.
5. Update E according to the solution to step 4. Repeat from step 2 until convergence.
I follow three distinct approaches to alleviate the curse of dimensionality that arises from
solving the model globally. First, I use a piecewise cubic Hermite spline to interpolate f  (S) ; X (S) ;
vb (n; S)g between the pre-dened grid points. Second, I abstain from the households wealth
accumulation process by letting lump-sum taxes T (S) adjust to ensure that
{ = D +D + w (S)  T (S) = E
as long as the government remains solvent, where E is a xed wealth parameter. This does not
a¤ect householdsincentives to save since they take T (S) as given, but eliminates { from the
state vector, reducing the number of state variables to 4.
Third, I take advantage of a series of characteristics of the banks rst order conditions
to reduce the computational burden in steps 2 and 4 signicantly. Specically, the FOCs
(65) and (67) indicate that the optimal choices fs; d0sg under a safe strategy are (i) indepen-
dent of

  (S) ; X (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
when ~ (n;S) = s (ii) independent of

  (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
when
 (n;S) > 0. Similarly, the FOCs (68) and (69) indicate that the optimal choices

g; d
0
g
	
under
a gambling strategy are independent of

  (S) ; vb (n;S)
	
. The relevant proofs are provided in
the Technical Appendix.
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5 Numerical results
This section provides numerical results from the dynamic model under a calibration that targets
Portugal. It proceeds in four steps. Section 5.1 describes the calibration. Section 5.2 discusses
the relationship between sovereign risk and the equilibrium regions. Section 5.3 demonstrates
the propagation of sovereign risk shocks with the use of impulse response functions to a sovereign
risk shock. Finally, Section 5.4 brings the model to data by comparing its t to the Portuguese
economy over 2010-2016.
5.1 Calibration
The calibration targets Portugal over the crisis period of 2010-2016 with each period represent-
ing a quarter. Table 3 reports the calibrated parameters.
The recovery rate of sovereign bonds is set to b = 0:6 according to Cruces and Trebesch
(2013). The calibration for the scal stress parameters (ss; ; 
2
) matches q
b (S) =q to the
yield spread between Portuguese and German bonds (which act as a benchmark for the safe
rate).42 Specically, I use (1) and (54) to back out a time series of scal stress realizations ^t
from the spread data under the calibrated recovery rate. The calibration for (ss; ; 
2
) is then
attained by tting the AR(1) process given by (55) to ^t.43
In the household sector, the discount factor is calibrated to  = 0:991=4 and the wealth
parameter targets data on household net worth from OECD. The calibration for the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion  = 3 lies within the range given by recent empirical estimates (Thimme, 2016).
Regarding rms, I set the output elasticity of capital to the standard Cobb-Douglas value
of  = 1=3. In the absence of sovereign default, productivity is normalized to A = 1 such that
A is equivalent to the recovery rate of loans l. The calibration for A targets the recovery rate
since sovereign default propagates through balance sheet costs to banks rather than the direct
e¤ects of productivity decline. Accordingly, I calibrate l = 0:90 in line with recent estimates
on the e¤ects of sovereign default on rm protability (Schreger and Hébert, 2015).44
The bank market share parameter  is calibrated to match the mark-up l in the loans
market to the average interest margin on domestic bank lending to non-nancial corporations
42I use bonds with a remaining maturity of 3 months due to the quarterly calibration of the model. While the
standard benchmark for measuring sovereign default risk is the yield/CDS spreads on 10 year bonds, it is not
possible to extract quarter-on-quarter default probabilities from these measures without imposing additional
restrictions on the yield curve.
43See the Technical Appendix for further details.
44This implies a relatively high output cost of default compared to the previous literature. It is worth noting,
however, that the calibration for l can be reconciled with lower output costs with the introduction of bankruptcy
costs or real frictions that limit the ability of rms to decrease salary costs following sovereign default. Note also
that, under the baseline calibration, the parameter restrictions in (15) are satised for a wide range of recovery
rates l 2 [0:59; 0:99]. The qualitative results presented throughout the paper, including the non-emptiness of
the multiple equilibria region, remain valid at all points within this range.
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during the pre-crisis period of 2003-2007.45 Finally, I calibrate the sunspot threshold to  = 0:5
such that good and bad sentiments are equally likely.
Table 3: Calibration
Parameter Value Description Source
b 0:60 Sov. bond recovery rate Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
ss  5:14 Fiscal stress (mean) Bloomberg
 0:74 Fiscal stress (persistence) Bloomberg
2 0:93 Fiscal stress (variance) Bloomberg
 0:991=4 Discount factor -
E 0:07E-9 Household wealth OECD
 3:00 Coe¢ cient of risk aversion Thimme (2016)
 0:33 Cobb-Douglas parameter -
A 1:00 Productivity (no sov. default) -
A 0:90 Productivity (sov. default) Schreger and Hébert (2015)
 0:005 Bank market share ECB Statistical Data Warehouse
 0:50 Probability of bad sentiments -
5.2 Sovereign risk and equilibrium regions
I begin analysing the numerical results by examining the implications of sovereign risk for the
equilibrium regions. Figure 14 provides a mapping of the prevalent equilibrium type across a
range of sovereign default probabilities P (S) and aggregate bank net worth N . As with the
two period model in section 3, the three equilibrium regions are ordered monotonically across
net worth: First, the gambling equilibrium is unique when net worth falls short of a boundary
N (S). Second, there is an intermediate multiplicity region N (S)  N  N (S). Finally, the
safe equilibrium is unique when net worth exceeds N (S).
These boundaries are contingent on sovereign default risk. When sovereign bonds are com-
pletely safe, only a safe equilibrium is possible.46 The emergence of sovereign risk, however,
45The relationship between the mark-up and the steady state price of loans is given by (71). I match this
with pre-crisis interest rates in order to isolate the excess return due to market power.
46This stems from the lack of other types of aggregate risk within the model environment. It can, however, be
interpreted as the reduced form outcome of a richer environment with capital regulation based on risk-weighted
assets. In this environment, capital requirements faced by a bank depend on the risk-weight attached to its
portfolio. For assets with non-sovereign risk, positive risk weights align the banks incentives towards following
a safe strategy. If sovereign bonds have zero risk-weight, Sovereign bonds, on the other hand, have a zero risk-
weight, then gambling is only possible in the presence of sovereign default risk. The preferential treatment for
sovereign bonds described here approximately reects the regulatory framework in the Euro area (Bank for
International Settlements, 2013).
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creates a large region with a unique gambling equilibrium. Further increases in sovereign risk
have a non-linear e¤ect on banks incentives to gamble. As sovereign risk rises, N (S) rst
increases, and then decreases while N (S) decreases throughout, leading to a widening of the
multiplicity region.
To understand these ndings, consider the implications of sovereign risk for bank payo¤s
under each strategy. When a bank follows the gambling strategy, a rise in sovereign risk has two
opposing e¤ects on its prots. First, it increases sovereign bond yields which raises prots from
gambling. Second, it leads to a rise in bank funding costs which reduces prots. At low levels
of sovereign risk, the former e¤ect dominates such that a rise in P (S) strengthens incentives
to gamble. As bank funding costs are determined by risk averse households, however, the
latter e¤ect becomes stronger as sovereign risk increases. N (S) peaks at the point where the
latter e¤ect becomes dominant and the value associated with adopting the gambling strategy
is negatively related to P (S) beyond this point.
The impact of sovereign risk on the safe strategy payo¤ is contingent on household senti-
ments. Recall that the banks solvency constraint coincides with its deposit threshold under
good sentiments. This ensures that the bank borrows at the risk-free rate regardless of the
sovereign default probability. As a result, the safe strategy payo¤ is largely independent of
P (S) when there are good sentiments.47 Under bad sentiments, the deposit threshold becomes
tighter than the solvency constraint due to the expectation of a high sovereign exposure. Despite
following a safe strategy, banks optimally breach the deposit threshold such that households
anticipate their insolvency under sovereign default. This leads to a positive relationship be-
tween bank funding costs and P (S). The safe strategy payo¤ thus decreases in sovereign risk
under bad sentiments.
This mechanism explains the widening of the multiplicity region as sovereign risk increases.
A rise in P (S) leads to a greater reduction in incentives to follow a safe strategy under bad
sentiments than it does under good sentiments. This leads to the expansion of the region of
net worth where both types of sentiments are self-fullling.
The pattern followed by the boundaries
 
N (S) ; N (S)

can also be explained by comparing
the safe and gambling strategy payo¤s. N (S) traces the levels of net worth where banks are
indi¤erent between the two strategies under bad sentiments. Since the payo¤ from gambling
rst increases then falls in P (S), while that of the safe strategy falls monotonically, N (S)
declines sharply as sovereign risk increases. In contrast, N (S) traces the points of indi¤erence
under good sentiments, where the safe strategy payo¤ is independent of P (S). Therefore, it
has the same non-monotonic shape as the gambling payo¤.
47To be precise, the payo¤ is independent of P (S) when the solvency constraint is binding, which is the case
at the boundary of net worth N (S). When the solvency constraint is slack, the expected payo¤ falls slightly as
P (S) increases due to a decline in bank lending.
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Figure 14: Equilibrium Mapping
5.3 Propagation of sovereign risk shocks
The next step is to evaluate the propagation of sovereign risk shocks. Figure 15 plots the
response of key variables to an increase in scal stress by 1.5 standard deviations. The top left
panel indicates that the shock increases the probability of sovereign default by the next quarter
from 0:6% to 2:3%.48
The second panel shows the evolution of aggregate bank net worth and the equilibrium re-
gions. The multiplicity region is depicted by the shaded area. Within this region, the prevalent
equilibrium type is determined by household sentiments. Good sentiments (i.e. a high sunspot
realization) lead to a safe equilibrium and bad sentiments result in a gambling equilibrium. The
equilibrium is unique outside the multiplicity region with a safe equilibrium above it (and a
gambling equilibrium below). For expositions sake, I select an initial level of net worth that lies
in this region and consider two specic scenarios. In the rst scenario, sentiments come out to
be good in each successive period such that there is always a safe equilibrium in the multiplicity
region. In the second scenario, successive bad sentiments lead to a gambling equilibrium within
the same region.
In the scenario with good sentiments, bank net worth increases rapidly and brings about an
early exit from the multiplicity region. With bad sentiments, on the other hand, the economy
remains trappedin the multiplicity region for a prolonged length of time. Since net worth is
48Recall that the economy immediately moves to the steady state following sovereign default. The impulse re-
sponses in Figure 15 correspond to a timeline where, in each successive period, it is revealed that the government
remains solvent.
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retained from bank prots, the implication is that prots are lower in the gambling equilibrium
compared to the safe equilibrium. This nding is surprising since, in the absence of a sovereign
default event, Figure 15 corresponds to a timeline where a gamble on domestic sovereign bonds
is successful. In other words, despite collecting a high yield from their risky bond purchases,
banks make lower prots under the gambling equilibrium than the safe equilibrium.49
The explanation lies in the impulse responses for bank funding costs and lending. The
panels in the second row of Figure 15 show that the gambling equilibrium entails high leverage
and exposure to domestic sovereign bonds. This creates the prospect of insolvency in the case
of sovereign default, which in turn increases bank funding costs to the detriment of prots.
In contrast, under the safe equilibrium, banks satisfy a solvency constraint that ensures their
solvency following sovereign default. This leads to low leverage and sovereign bond exposure
such that bank funding costs remain at the risk-free rate. Moreover, the solvency constraint
binds in the multiplicity region such that banks reduce their lending to rms. The top right
panel shows the rise in loan interest rates caused by this. Together with relatively low funding
costs, the excess returns created by the rise in loan interest rates explains the rapid rise in net
worth under good sentiments.
Figure 15: Impulse responses to a sovereign risk shock
Note: All interest rates are annualized.
It is instructive to decompose the increase in loan interest rates, which is proportionate to
49Recall that banks take household sentiments as given when deciding on their optimal strategies.
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Figure 16: Decomposition of bank lending
Note: All values are annualized. Bank lending and output are in percentage points.
the decline in bank lending and output. Figure 16 shows impulse responses for loan interest
rates, aggregate bank lending and output under the same sovereign risk shock as Figure 15. In
addition to the two scenarios above, it plots a third scenario with high initial net worth such
that the safe equilibrium is unique and the solvency constraint is slack.
Compared to the (risk-free) steady state, the interest rates on loans increase and bank
lending declines even in the high net worth case. This constitutes an e¢ cient decline in
bank lending in view of the risk that loans become non-performing under sovereign default. In
the scenario with good sentiments (and low initial net worth), bank lending initially declines
signicantly below the e¢ cient level due to the deleveraging process described above, but
returns back to the e¢ cient level from the second period onwards as net worth increases.
When there are bad sentiments, on the other hand, bank lending is crowded out by domestic
sovereign bond purchases. This leads to a relatively mild, but still signicant decline below
the e¢ cient level compared to the good sentiments case, with crowding out e¤ects accounting
for roughly 75% of the total decline in bank lending (and output). The decline is persistent,
however, due to the slow increase in bank net worth.
Overall, the scenarios with good and bad sentiments highlight two alternative paths of
adjustment to a sovereign risk shock when the banking sector is under-capitalized. Under
the safe equilibrium, the nancial soundness of the banking sector is preserved by aggressive
deleveraging and there is a sharp but short-lived recession. As banks remain solvent even in the
event of sovereign default, bank funding costs remain at the risk-free rate. In contrast, under
bad sentiments, the economy becomes stuck in a gambling trapcharacterized by a banking
sector with high domestic sovereign bond exposure and persistent crowding out of bank lending.
There is also considerable nancial fragility due to the sovereign-bank nexus. If the government
defaults at any point before the exit from the multiplicity region, this causes a banking crisis.
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As such, bank funding costs become highly correlated with sovereign bond yields.50
5.4 Comparison with Portuguese data
This section compares the models t to Portuguese data. The comparative exercise is con-
ducted by simulating the model economy under a series of sovereign risk shocks "0d that exactly
match qb (S) 1 to quarterly Portuguese sovereign bond yields over 2010Q1-2016Q1. I also cal-
ibrate initial bank net worth to match the Tier 1 capital of the Portuguese banking sector in
2009, while the remainder of the parameters are calibrated as in section 5.1.
Figure 17 contrasts the simulated series under good and bad sentiments (which are taken to
be persistent as in the previous section) with data on the Portuguese economy. The rst panel
displays the sovereign default probabilities implied by the match with Portuguese sovereign
bond yields. The probability of government default by the next quarter peaks at 2:78% in the
nal quarter of 2011.
The second panel shows the simulated series for bank net worth and the multiplicity region
which evolves according to changes in sovereign default probabilities as explained in section
5.2. The simulation places the Portuguese economy in the region with a unique gambling
equilibrium in 2010Q1, after which it enters the multiplicity region. Thereafter, bank net
worth follows di¤erent paths under good and bad sentiments. As in the previous section,
good sentiments result in a safe equilibrium and a rapid increase in net worth that moves the
economy into the region with a unique safe equilibrium. Bad sentiments, on the other hand,
lead to a gambling equilibrium with stagnating net worth such that the economy remains in
the multiplicity region.
The model has partial success in emulating changes in loan interest rates. The third panel
shows that the simulated series under bad sentiments captures the initial increase in loan
interest rates but overshoots at the peak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2012, and slightly
undershoots thereafter. The simulated series under good sentiments suggests a large increase
in interest rates in 2011, which is not reected in the data. This is due to the binding solvency
constraint prior to the exit from the multiplicity region, which leads to a signicant decline in
bank lending as in the previous section.
50Household and bank values are higher under the safe equilibrium at all times despite the sharp decline in
output. With regard to bank values, this nding is due to the increase in net worth under the safe equilibrium.
Households place a higher value on the safe equilibrium due to risk aversion. Although the deleveraging by
banks causes an initial decline in wages, it precludes a haircut on deposits in the event of sovereign default. Since
consumption is already low following sovereign default due to the decline in productivity, risk averse households
place a high value on avoiding the haircut. Note that this is true regardless of bank net worth as the size of a
haircut on deposits under the gambling equilibrium is proportionate to the decline in bank lending in the safe
equilibrium. Furthermore, due to the slow increase in net worth under the gambling equilibrium, this calculus
is not a¤ected by the extent of sovereign risk in the current period, but rather the cumulative probability of
default until exit from the multiplicity region, which is signicantly higher.
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Figure 17: Comparison with Portuguese data
Note: All interest rates are annualized. Sovereign default probabilities are extracted from the yield spread
between Portuguese and German bonds with 3 month maturity remaining as described in section 5.1. The
domestic sovereign bond exposure series is constructed using data from stress tests and transparency exercises
conducted between 2009-2016 as well as individual bank balance sheets. See the Technical Appendix for further
details about data. Source: OECD, ECB, EBA.
The models main success is in replicating the evolution of bank funding costs. As shown
in the fourth panel, the simulated series under bad sentiments provides a very close match to
deposit interest rates in Portugal. Both of these series correlate highly with sovereign default
probabilities. Under good sentiments, on the other hand, interest rates remain at the risk-free
rate from 2010Q2 onwards. The fth panel compares the simulated series for bank leverage
with the leverage ratio of the Portuguese banking sector.51 The simulated series under bad
sentiments somewhat overshoots its counterpart in data, but captures the slow decline in bank
leverage over the crisis period.
Finally, the last panel contrasts the share of funds spent on domestic sovereign bond pur-
chases. The series under bad sentiments reects the gradual increase in the exposure to domestic
sovereign debt, but indicates a higher exposure than is observed in the data. A potential expla-
nation for this is that the data accounts only for direct exposure via sovereign bond holdings,
whereas a banks actual exposure to domestic sovereign risk also involves indirect exposure
51Although the latter containts non-depository liabilities which are not directly present in the model, the
nature of deposits as a choice variable captures the optimal leverage decision of banks.
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through holdings of assets with correlated risk, such as government bonds of other risky Euro-
pean countries and securities issued by banks with a high exposure to these. The simulation
under good sentiments indicates a large drop in exposure which is not present in the data.
Overall, the gambling equilibrium, which is consistent with bad sentiments, has more success
in replicating Portuguese data than the scenario with good sentiments.
6 Policy analysis
This section evaluates policy interventions aimed at strengthening the banking sector and re-
invigorating bank lending. It is clear from the numerical results in section 5 that both of these
aims can be achieved with a capital injection to the banking sector that directly increases bank
net worth N . However, this requires a signicant transfer of resources at a time when the
government is cash-struck.
Instead, I focus on unconventional interventions that can be implemented by the central
bank and macroprudential policy measures. Section 6.1 considers (non-targeted) liquidity pro-
vision to the banking sector by the central bank, which is comparable to the ECBs longer-term
renancing operations (LTRO) in the stylized environment of the model. Section 6.2 proposes
an alternative measure, targeted liquidity provision, where the central bank provides liquidity
conditional on bank leverage. Finally, section 6.3 shows that the ndings from sections 6.1 and
6.2 can be generalized to provide insights for deposit insurance and a range of macroprudential
policies.
6.1 Liquidity provision
I incorporate liquidity provision into the model by allowing each bank to issue debt dc  dc to
the central bank at a risk-free price q.52 It is instructive to rst evaluate this intervention in
the two-period environment described in section 3 before transitioning to a dynamic setting.
With access to central bank liquidity, the representative banks budget constraint and prots
become
n+ qd+ qdc = qbb+ qll
 = max f0; l + b  d  dcg
 = max

0; ll + bb  d  dc	
52I abstain from collateral requirements on debt issued to the central bank. In practice, collateral requirements
do not preclude the form of gambling considered here as long as risky domestic sovereign debt is eligible as
collateral. This is the case with LTROs since the ECBs decision to suspend collateral eligibility requirements
for sovereign debt issued by distressed Euro area countries (European Central Bank, 2012). In this context,
placing a haircut on sovereign debt pledged as collateral is equivalent to a reduction in dc.
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Crucially, the e¤ects of central bank liquidity hinge on whether it leads to a transfer of bank
insolvency risk from depositors to the central bank.
Liquidity provision with no risk transfer Consider rst the case with no risk transfer
such that liabilities to the central bank have greater seniority than deposits. In other words,
debt repayments to the central bank take priority over deposits in the event that the bank
becomes insolvent. This ensures that the central bank is not exposed to any potential losses at
the expense of diluting depositorsclaim to bank revenues.53
The dilution of deposits proves to be crucial in undermining the policy intervention. It
creates a negative relationship between the amount of central bank liquidity dc held by the
bank and the recovery rate of deposits . This is reected in the deposit demand schedule,
which is now given by
qc (~; d; dc) =
8><>:
q for d+ dc  d (~)
q
1 P+P

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql

n+qdc
d

  dc
d

1 qP

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql
 for d+ dc > d (~) (72)
where the deposit threshold d (~) remains unchanged. When the parameter restrictions in (15)
are satised, a rise in central bank liquidity dc leads to an inward shift in the deposit demand
schedule. Using (14) and (72), it is easy to show that the banks ability to raise funds is
independent of dc such that
qc (~; d; dc) d+ dc = q (~; d) d 8 dc  dc
where q (~; d) is the deposit demand schedule in the absence of liquidity provision. This indicates
that the deterioration in bank borrowing conditions due to dilution exactly o¤sets the gains
from central bank liquidity. Consequently, liquidity provision is completely ine¤ective without
a risk transfer to the central bank.
Liquidity provision with risk transfer Now consider the case where the repayment of
deposits takes priority over obligations to the central bank. This constitutes an implicit transfer
of bank insolvency risk from depositors to the central bank as the recovery rate of deposits
increases at the expense of central bank losses. The deposit demand schedule is then given by
53This is true unless the liquidity provided by the central bank exceeds total bank revenues under sovereign
default. The restriction dc  b
1 b d is su¢ cient to preclude this, and is satised under plausible values for
dc.
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the expressions
qc (~; d; dc) =
8><>:
q for d  dc (~; dc)
q
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) l
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
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
~ 
b
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+(1 ~) l
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 for d > dc (~; dc)
9>=>; , (73)
dc (~; dc) =

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
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
(n+ qdc)
1  q

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
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
Rather than being diluted, the expected value of deposits increases in central bank liquidity dc,
causing an outwards shift in the deposit demand schedule as shown in Figure 18.
To evaluate the implications of this, consider rst the case under good sentiments. Suppose
the representative bank adopts the safe strategy. Liquidity provision will then have no impact
on its expected payo¤ and the bank will be indi¤erent to central bank liquidity. This is due
to two reasons. First, the safe strategy requires that the bank remains solvent under sovereign
default. This precludes the bank from taking advantage of the risk transfer. Second, recall from
section 3.2.1 that banks which follow a safe strategy borrow from depositors at the risk-free
rate under good sentiments. As such, the provision of cheap liquidity by the central bank does
not lead to a reduction in bank funding costs.
Suppose instead that the bank deviates to a gambling strategy. It will optimally borrow
the maximum amount dc from the central bank, both to directly benet from low interest rates
attached to central bank liquidity and to attain a more favourable deposit demand schedule by
facilitating the transfer of risk away from depositors.
Note that the rst order conditions (20), (21) for the gambling strategy remain unchanged.
Therefore, the bank does not change its lending to rms in response to liquidity provision.
Instead, it takes advantage of the outward shift in its deposit demand schedule to increase
its deposits and domestic sovereign bond purchases until its borrowing costs return to their
level prior to the intervention. Therefore, the recovery rate of deposits  also remains at its
pre-intervention level such that depositors face the same amount of insolvency risk. In other
words, the risk transfer simply provides the bank with an opportunity to increase the extent of
its gamble on domestic sovereign bonds at the expense of the central bank. Accordingly, the
expected payo¤ associated with a deviation to gambling increases to
vgjs = (1  P )llgjs +
n
q
+ P dc (74)
Using (74), Proposition 5 shows that liquidity provision (with risk transfer) backres by
eliminating the safe equilibrium.
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Proposition 5 The gambling equilibrium is unique for all n when
dc > ~dc  l
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 11 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When dc  ~dc, the gambling equilibrium is unique for n  n where n is implicity dened by the
expression
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> 0
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
The rst part of the proposition shows that when banks have access to central bank liquidity
in excess of an upper bound ~dc, they nd it optimal to gamble even when the solvency constraint
is slack. Gambling then becomes the unique equilibrium regardless of bank net worth. The
second part shows that even for dc  ~dc, the intervention shifts up the boundary of net worth
n below which there is a unique gambling equilibrium.
The case under bad sentiments is depicted in Figure 18. The outcome under the gambling
strategy is similar to the deviation to gambling considered above. In contrast to the case
with good sentiments, however, it is possible for banks deviating to the safe strategy to face
borrowing costs above the risk-free rate.54 Liquidity provision may then increase the expected
payo¤ associated with the safe strategy by reducing bank funding costs. Therefore, the two
period environment is ambiguous as to whether the upper boundary of the multiplicity region
n increases or decreases in response to liquidity provision.
In order to analyze this, I conduct a policy experiment based on an extension of the dynamic
model in section 4. Specically, I extend the dynamic model to include liquidity provision (with
risk transfer) as a pre-determined state variable dc.55 For T periods, this variable follows a pre-
determined path

dct
	T
t=0
before returning to zero permanently.56
54Figure 18 provides an example of this where the solvency constraint remains slack. It is also possible for the
solvency constraint to become binding as shown in the third panel of Figure 12. In this case, liquidity provision
leads to a relaxation of the solvency constraint.
55The changes in the deposit demand schedule and the banks problem are similar to the two period model.
I relegate the relevant expressions to Appendix C in the interest of brevity.
56The equilibrium allocation in the steady state after sovereign default is independent of dc. Therefore, there
is no need to take a stance on the evolution of dct following sovereign default.
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Figure 18: Liquidity provision with risk transfer
Note: The deposit demand schedule is attained by combining (73) with (29).
The deposit supply curve stems from the combination of (3), (25), (26) and
(47). Only the case with a slack solvency constraint is included. For the
remaining cases see Figure 12.
I opt for this set up for two reasons. First, in the absence of debt with long-term matu-
rity, giving banks the option to rollover their debt for T periods approximates the maturity
structure of the LTROs.57 Second, this set up allows for the solution of the extended model
by iterating backwards from the end date T . This makes the additional computational burden
from including the policy intervention negligible.58
57The LTROs had a 3 year maturity with an early repayment option after 1 year (European Central Bank,
2011). In the context of the model, exercising the early repayment option is equivalent to choosing dct = 0
for the remaining periods. Although this does not exactly correspond to the single window for repayment in
LTROs, it emerges as a result that banks either strictly prefer to take the maximum amount of funding in each
period or are indi¤erent to the amount of central bank liquidity they receive. Therefore, the frequency and
timing of the early repayment option has no impact on the numerical results.
58When the policy expires at T + 1, the extended model becomes identical to the baseline model. Therefore,
future expectations at T for
ET+1; T+1 (S) ; XT+1 (S) ; vbT+1 (n;S)	 can be attained by taking expectations
according to the solution to the baseline model. The solution to the model at period T is then attained by using
the steps in section 4.7. Instead of iterating until convergence, the solution
ET ; T (S) ; XT (S) ; vbT (n;S)	 is
used to take expectations for T   1. This process is repeated until t = 0.
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Figure 19: Liquidity provision in a dynamic environment
Note: All interest rates are annualized.
Figure 19 plots the impulse responses to the same sovereign risk shock as in section 5.3.59
The rst panel shows that the multiplicity region shifts upwards and expands signicantly due
to the policy intervention. As a result of this, the economy remains in the multiplicity region
even after the deleveraging process under good sentiments. Under bad sentiments, on the other
hand, net worth increases slightly faster relative to the baseline case due to the increase in
gambling prots. The lower boundary of the multiplicity region also shifts up, however, and
entry into the region with a unique gambling equilibrium is only narrowly avoided.
The remaining panels highlight the changes in the gambling equilibrium under the policy
intervention.60 As in the two period environment, banks respond to liquidity provision by
increasing their sovereign exposure until their funding costs return to their pre-intervention
level. The top right panel shows that leverage initially increases due to the rise in borrowing
by banks (both from the central bank and depositors) but falls below the baseline level over
time as net worth increases more rapidly.
Overall, it appears that when liquidity provision transfers insolvency risk from depositors
59I calibrate T = 12 in line with LTROs and set dct = d
c < ~dc. The remaining parameters follow the baseline
calibration in section 5.1.
60The impulse responses under good sentiments, and those for loan interest rates are excluded as they remain
identical to the baseline case in Figure 15.
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to the central bank, it backres not only by eliminating the safe equilibrium at low levels of
net worth, but also by expanding multiplicity to higher levels of net worth. When combined
with the irrelevance of liquidity provisionsansrisk transfer, this leads to the conclusion that
the equilibrium outcome cannot be improved through the indiscriminate provision of liquidity
to the banking sector.
This negative result stems from the inability of non-targeted interventions to distinguish
between banking strategies, which in turn leads to a trade-o¤ between alleviating funding
conditions under the safe strategy and strengthening incentives to gamble. In the next section,
I propose a targeted intervention that overcomes this trade-o¤.
6.2 Targeted liquidity provision
Under targeted liquidity provision, the central bank o¤ers a liquidity schedule dc (d; n) condi-
tional on deposits and bank net worth. By o¤ering a liquidity schedule
dc (n; d) =

l
qls
  b
qb

qlsls +
b
qb
n
1  b
qb
q
  d (75)
which overlaps with the solvency constraint under good sentiments, the central bank can com-
pletely insulate the banking sector from shifts in depositor sentiments.
By design, the schedule has no impact on banksfunding conditions under good sentiments.
When there is a shift to bad sentiments, however, it provides banks with low cost liquidity in a
manner that articially re-creates the funding conditions under good sentiments. It then follows
directly from the equilibrium conditions (43), (44) that bad sentiments cease to be self-fullling
throughout the multiplicity region. The intervention remains strictly o¤-equilibrium when it
is successful, since banks are indi¤erent between central bank and deposit funding in the safe
equilibrium.
The conditionalities on (n; d) are crucial for the success of the intervention. By placing an
upper bound on participating banksleverage, these conditionalities ensure that banks do not
nd it optimal to take up central bank liquidity under the gambling strategy. This overcomes
the trade-o¤ faced by non-targeted liquidity provision, allowing the intervention to improve
banksfunding conditions under the safe strategy without increasing incentives to gamble.
Note that the results from section 6.1 with regard to the irrelevance of liquidity provision
without a risk transfer remain valid. Therefore, at least in principle, the targeted intervention
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requires that the central bank becomes exposed to bank insolvency risk.61 In practice, however,
the central bank never faces losses under targeted liquidity provision. This is not just due to the
fact that successful interventions are never implemented in equilibrium. Even if the liquidity
schedule is o¤ered in the region with a unique gambling equilibrium such that the intervention
fails, the conditionalities ensure that banks do not take up central bank liquidity in a gambling
equilibrium.
The role of the conditionalities is thus twofold. First, they drive a wedge between the safe
and gambling strategies and allow the central bank to make the former more attractive, thereby
eliminating multiplicity in favour of the safe equilibrium. Second, they ensure that the central
bank is not subject to losses even when the intervention is unsuccessful.
Finally, note that the central bank does not need to observe the sovereign exposure  in
order to implement this intervention. This raises the question as to why the central bank is
capable of carrying out this intervention while the households cannot. The answer lies in the
ability of the central bank to internalize the equilibrium-switching e¤ects of its behaviour, and
thus commit to the liquidity schedule in (75). In contrast, for atomistic households that take
sentiments as given, (75) is strictly sub-optimal to the deposit demand schedule. In other words,
targeted liquidity provision resolves a coordination problem between banks and depositors.62
6.3 Deposit insurance and macroprudential regulation
In this section, I generalize the ndings from sections 6.1 and 6.2 to a wider set of policy
instruments. To begin with, consider deposit insurance in the form of a limited amount of
funds F= dedicated to increasing the recovery rate  of deposits, which can then be written as
 = min

1;

~
b
qb
+ (1  ~) 
l
ql
n
d
+ q

+
F
d

61This does not necessarily need to take the form of an explicit arrangement where depositors have greater
seniority. When the central bank has priority in debt repayments, providing the liquidity schedule above under
bad sentiments completely crowds out deposit funding. Without deposits to act as a bu¤er, bank insolvency
results in losses for the central bank.
62Note that targeted liquidity provision di¤ers from the targeted longer-term renancing operations (TLTROs)
implemented by the ECB in that the latter provide liquidity conditional on bank lending. In the setting here,
liquidity provision conditional on l does not a¤ect incentives to gamble since banks have the ability to further
increase their leverage to purchase sovereign bonds after satisfying the lending conditionality. Therefore, it is
largely similar to non-targeted liquidity provision, with the addition that it may lead to a rise in bank lending
in the gambling equilibrium when su¢ cient liquidity is provided along with a risk transfer.
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This leads to the following deposit demand schedule
qF (~; d; F ) =
8><>:
q for d  dF (~; F )
q
1 P+P

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql

n+F

1
d
1 qP

~ 
b
qb
+(1 ~) l
ql
 for d > dF (~; F ) (76)
dF (~; F ) =

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
ql

n+ F
1  q

~ 
b
qb
+ (1  ~) l
ql

which indicates that deposit insurance leads to an outward shift in the deposit demand schedule.
Proposition 6 shows that, on its own, deposit insurance backres in the same manner as non-
targeted liquidity provision (with risk transfer).
Proposition 6 For any arbitrary "  0
qF (~; d; ") d = qc (~; d; ") d+ q"
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
As before, the negative result stems from the trade-o¤ between alleviating funding condi-
tions and strengthening incentives to gamble. This trade-o¤ can be overcome with the use of
macroprudential regulation. Specically, the combination of deposit insurance with a regula-
tory constraint on bank liabilities can lead to a similar outcome to targeted liquidity provision.
This is achieved by dedicating su¢ cient funds to deposit insurance to o¤set the e¤ects of a shift
to bad sentiments on the deposit demand schedule
F =

l
qls
  
b
qb

qlsls
and imposing a regulatory constraint that overlaps with the solvency constraint in the safe
equilibrium63
d 
F + 
b
qb
n
1  b
qb
q
Finally, note that the same outcome can be achieved with alternative forms of macropruden-
tial regulation. For example, the liability constraint above is interchangeable with a constraint
on asset holdings or capital requirements in a richer environment with equity issuance, provided
that there is a positive risk-weight attached to domestic sovereign bond holdings.
63If participation in the deposit insurance and macroprudential regulation scheme is non-voluntary, the failure
of the policy may lead to the use of deposit insurance funds in equilibrium. In the region with a unique gambling
equilibrium, banks respond to a non-voluntary scheme by following a gambling strategy despite satisfying the
regulatory constraint.
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7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model with optimizing banks and depositors to analyse the implications
of a sovereign debt crisis for economic vulnerability and policy design. Two important insights
emerge as a consequence. First, banks with low net worth have an incentive to gamble on
domestic sovereign bonds when they expect to su¤er from macroeconomic losses in the event of
sovereign default. Second, optimal depositor reactions to insolvency risk impose discipline on
banks but also leave the economy susceptible to self-fullling shifts in sentiments when bank
balance sheets are not entirely transparent.
The propagation of sovereign risk shocks di¤ers substantially between the two equilibria.
In a safe equilibrium, deleveraging by banks preserves the nancial soundness of the banking
sector at the expense of a sharp, brief drop in output. In a gambling equilibrium, banks respond
to a sovereign debt crisis by increasing their domestic sovereign bond purchases. This leads
to a rise in bank funding costs and the crowding out of bank lending to the private sector.
The economy may then become stuck in a gambling trapwith a prolonged period of nancial
fragility and a persistent drop in output. The model is calibrated to Portugal over 2010-2016,
and simulated dynamics under the gambling equilibrium match the observed behaviour of the
Portuguese economy.
The model can also be used as a framework for policy analysis. As a novel insight, it
suggests that non-targeted liquidity provision to banks may actually backre by eliminating
the safe equilibrium. This stems from a trade-o¤ between alleviating funding constraints and
strengthening incentives to gamble. It is possible to overcome this trade-o¤ with a targeted
intervention that provides liquidity conditional on bank leverage.
Finally, the mechanisms considered in this paper can be interpreted in a broader context
than a sovereign debt crisis. Incentives to gamble are strong whenever an assets payo¤ is highly
correlated to a banks own insolvency risk. This would be the case, for example, when a bank
has a large pre-existing exposure to an illiquid asset. Self-fullling sentiments may then arise
for creditors which are not covered by deposit insurance, especially when regulation is perceived
to be insu¢ ciently strict to prevent insolvency. Nevertheless, these mechanisms are particularly
strong in the case of domestic sovereign bonds due to the triple coincidence of high correlation
between sovereign default risk and aggregate risk, zero risk-weight in regulation for domestic
sovereign bonds and the prospect of depositor losses in the aftermath of sovereign default.
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8 Appendix
A Deviation to the safe strategy
In the rst case, the bank has su¢ cient net worth to satisfy the rst order condition (26) while
remaining within the deposit threshold d
 
g

. Its deposits are thus valued on par with safe
assets qsjg = q and its valuation of loans is equivalent to the equilibrium counterpart such that
qlsjg = q
l
s. There are, however, two notable di¤erences. First, as with the deviation to gambling,
the quantity of lending lsjg is conditional on lending provided by the remaining banks such that
lsjg =
 
qls
 
1  (A)
1
1    1  

lg (77)
Second, the inward shift in the deposit threshold d
 
g

under bad sentiments increases the
boundary of net worth
nrjg 

qb   bq
qb

qlslsjg > nc (78)
required for this case to be valid.
Note also that the deviating banks expected payo¤ is given by the expression
vsjg =
 
1  P + Plllsjg + nq (79)
which di¤ers from (39) only in terms of lsjg.64 This reects that a shift to bad sentiments has
no impact on the banks ability to borrow when its net worth lies above nrjg.
In the second case, bank net worth falls short of nrjg such that it is not possible to satisfy
(26) without breaching the deposit threshold d
 
g

. The optimal allocation, leaves the bank
with a level of deposits dsjg > d
 
g

which is in the risky region of the deposit demand
schedule with qsjg < q, while the actual solvency constraint is slack. Proposition 2 indicates
that there are no domestic sovereign bond purchases
 
bsjg = 0

in this case, while the price and
quantity of loans are pinned down by the rst order condition (26) as
qlsjg =
 
1  P + Pl (1  l) qb (80)
lsjg =
 
qlsjg
 
1  (A)
1
1    1  

lg (81)
Using the budget constraint, the price of deposits can also be written as
dsjg =
qlsjg
qb
lsjg   n
(1  P ) q
64As with the safe equilibrium, domestic sovereign bond purchases bsjg and deposits dsjg are indeterminate
in this case but have no impact on expected payo¤.
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and the deviating banks expected payo¤ is given by the expression
vsjg =
 
1  P + Plllsjg + n(1  P ) q (82)
which is lower than (79) due to the increase in bank funding costs.
The solvency constraint binds in the third case. The quantity of loans is determined im-
plicitly by the expression0@ lsjg + 1  lg 11 
(A)
1
a
  qbl
1A lsjg = qb
1  P
n
q
attained by using (47) and (81) to substitute for q
 
g; dsjg

and qlsjg in (48). The expression for
expected payo¤ in this case is identical to the constrained case of the safe equilibrium
vsjg = (1  P )
 
1  l lsjg (83)
and this case is valid when net worth is below the boundary
n < ncjg 
 
qlsjg
qb
  l
!
(1  P ) qlsjg (84)
where

qlsjg; lsjg

are dened according to (80) and (81).65
B Households recursive problem
Households supply labour inelastically to rms and have risk averse preferences with their ow
utility u (c) given by a standard CRRA specication. The representative households problem
can be written as
vh (D;D; S) = max
c;D0;D0
8<: u (c) +  (1  P (S))ES

vh (D0; D0; S0)

+P (S) vh (D0; D0; S0)
9=;
65The discontinuous jump in d
 
g; d

as deposits dsjg cross the threshold d
 
g

leads to the possibility of a
fourth case. In this case, net worth is below nrjg but the rst order condition (80) associated with the second
case leads the bank to select a level of deposits within the threshold dsjg  d
 
g

. The optimal behaviour of
the deviating bank, and the associated net worth boundaries can be then be determined by treating the deposit
threshold as a binding constraint. I relegate this case to the Technical Appendix, as it does not have an impact
on the mechanism or the outcome.
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subject to
c+ qD0 + qD0 = D +D   T (S) + w (S) (85)
S0 =   (S)
where   (:) is the law of motion for the aggregate state variables and vh (:) represents the
households continuation value under sovereign default. Lemma 6 provides an expression for
vh (:).
Lemma 6 The continuation value for households in the steady state S is
vh (D0; D0; S) =
1
1  u (c) ,
c = (1  q)

D0 +D0 +
1  

A
A
L (S)

+ qw   T
where w is given by
w = (1  )AK
Proof. Provided in the Technical Appendix.
Observe that consumption c in the steady state is positively related to household wealth
after sovereign default, which is increasing in the recovery rate  of domestic deposits. Using the
above expressions, the rst order conditions for risk-free assets D and domestic bank deposits
D can be written as
q = 
(1  P (S))uc (c0) + P (S)uc (c)
uc (c)
q = 
(1  P (S))uc (c0) + P (S) uc (c)
uc (c)
where uc (:) is marginal utility.
As in section 3.1.5, the recovery rate anticipated by households depends on household ex-
pectations about the banks domestic sovereign bond exposure ~ (n;S).
 = min

1;

~ (n;S)
b
qb (S)
+ (1  ~ (n;S)) 
l
ql (S)
 n
d0
+ q

The deposit demand schedule is attained by combining this expression with the households
rst order conditions.
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C Liquidity Provision
In periods t  T , the model is characterized by
d (n;S) =

~ (n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+ (1  ~ (n;S)) l
ql(S)

(n+ qdct)
1  q

~ (n;S) 
b
qb(S)
+ (1  ~ (n;S)) l
ql(S)

q (d0; n;S) =
8>><>>:
q for d0  d (n;S)
q
1 P (S)+P (S) uc(c)
uc(c0)

g
b
qb(S)
+(1 g) 
l
ql(S)

n+qdct
d0
1 qP (S) uc(c)
uc(c0)

g
b
qb(S)
+(1 g) 
l
ql(S)
 for d0 > d (n;S)
 = l + b  d0   dct
 = max
 
ll + bb  d0   dct ; 0

d0 + dct  ll + bb
vbt (n; S) = max

vbs;t (n; S) ; v
b
g;t (n; S)
	
vbs;t (n; S) = max
d0;dct dct ;2[0;1]
8<: (1  P (S))
 
(1   )  +  ES

vbt+1 (n
0; S0)

+P (S)
 
(1   )  +  vb (n0; S)
9=;
vbg;t (n; S) = max
d0;dct dct ;2[0;1]

(1  P (S))  (1   )  +  ES vbt+1 (n0; S0)	
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